


JPRS-TAC-94-003

7 March 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-94-003

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Missile, Astronautics Journal Starts Publication

*HK1502140894 Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO
in Chinese 7 Feb 94 p 2*

[By An Bo (1344 0590): "ZHONGGUO DAODAN YU
HANGTIAN WENZHAI Published"]

[Text] With the approval of the State Science and Technology Commission, the first journal of specialized indexes on missile and astronautics—ZHONGGUO DAODAN YU HANGTIAN WENZHAI [CHINA MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS DIGEST]—began publication at the end of January. The journal is compiled and published in both Chinese and English, the first domestic journal of its kind to do so.

JAPAN

Prime Minister Hosokawa at Georgetown University 11 February*OW 1202050694 Tokyo KYODO in English 0358 GMT 11 Feb 94*

[Excerpts] Washington, Feb. 11 KYODO—[passage omitted]

All these efforts are essential, but there is another, even greater challenge. The end of the Cold War has created new opportunities for arms control and disarmament. One of Japan's major goals is to strengthen the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] system for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why one of the first international policy decisions I made after becoming prime minister asserted Japan's strong support for the indefinite extension of the NPT beyond 1995.

There have been reports in the last few days that Japan might change its policy should North Korea arm itself with nuclear weapons. I wish the people who write such reports would come to Japan and talk to our people. Then they would realize how deeply we feel about this issue. Let me be very clear on this point: I see no possibility that Japan would decide to become a nuclear power. Such a policy would be against Japan's national interest. We, like you, are very concerned about the current situation on the Korean peninsula. And we are determined, working closely with government leaders in the Republic of Korea and America, to help settle this issue.

On the issue of conventional arms control, Japan also is actively involved. We are the only major nation in the world which is not selling any weapons to other countries. We have proposed a UN-supervised system to make it easier to monitor international sales of conventional arms. We want to broaden this system, to make it more effective. [passage omitted]

IRAQ

Chemical, Biological Weapons Said Hidden in Oil Pipelines*NC1302151494 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi People in Arabic 1400 GMT 13 Feb 94*

[Text] To hide them from the eyes of international inspectors, the regime of tyrant Saddam Husayn has been transferring its remaining chemical and biological weapons from one place to another. According to people who recently arrived in Amman, the dictatorial regime began using the oil pipelines—out of operation because of the international embargo—in one last attempt to hide its banned weapons.

IAEA Sets Up Monitoring Cameras at Nuclear Site*NC1102203994 Paris AFP in English 1948 GMT 11 Feb 94*

[Text] Manama, Feb 11 (AFP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency has set up two cameras at an Iraqi nuclear site under UN resolutions for the long-term monitoring of the country's arms program, an IAEA official said here Friday.

"Two close-circuit cameras have been installed and activated in an engineering facility at Um al-Ma'arik (Mother of All Battles), 20 minutes from Baghdad, with two film cameras as a back-up," said Gary Dillon, a Briton, about the site that was part of Iraq's enriched uranium production program.

"The work was carried out without a hitch and the Iraqis were cooperative," said Dillon about his seven-member IAEA team that just completed a week-long mission in Iraq.

On Feb 4, IAEA deputy chief Maurizio Zifferero said experts from his agency would remove the last batch of Iraq's irradiated fuel and start setting up cameras at former nuclear sites.

The team was to have arranged removal of the five kilograms (11 pounds) of fuel believed to be left in Iraq. Some 35 kilograms (77 pounds) were removed on December 5.

"The IAEA team will be back within two months to continue their work of installing surveillance cameras at maybe two or three more sites, where up to 20 cameras may be set up in total," Dillon said.

Another 11 chemical weapons experts, led by Horst Reeps from Germany, accompanied Dillon's team on Friday. It completed a 10-day mission to identify and collect equipment Iraq had used in producing chemical weapons.

"We completed our mission of identifying, tagging and filing 250 pieces of chemical production equipment of dual use nature. Part of these were used during the Iran-Iraq war," Reeps said.

"Our main aim was to get more information on the planned use of this equipment in the future. Iraq has said it intends to make use of them for the production of pesticides, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals," he said.

He said that some of the equipment was never used, some used on a regular basis and some would be the subject of new discussions with the Iraqis on their planned use.

In the hope of obtaining an end to a three-year embargo, Iraqi authorities are cooperating with efforts to dismantle programs for making weapons of mass destruction which are banned under UN resolutions ending the 1991 Gulf war.

The embargo was imposed four days after Iraq's forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990.

MIO Director Refutes UN Ambassador Ekeus

*JN1602115894 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1110 GMT
16 Feb 94*

[Text] Baghdad, 16 Feb (INA)—Lt. Gen. Engineer 'Amir Muhammad Rashid, director of the Military Industrialization Organization [MIO], has expressed amazement over the contradictions contained in the statements Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of the UN Special Commission, made to the U.S. television Cable News Network [CNN], yesterday, Tuesday, 15 February.

In a statement to INA, Lt. Gen. Rashid added that in his statements, Ekeus gave the impression that Iraq continues to withhold information on chemical weapons.

The MIO director urged the chairman of the UN Special Commission to shoulder his responsibilities fairly, to confine himself to the tasks of the UN Special Commission as spelled out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and to steer clear of the U.S. anti-Iraq political maneuvers and pressures, which have nothing to do with the UN security Council resolutions.

The following is the text of the statement:

MIO Director General Lt. Gen. 'Amir Muhammad Rashid has said: We have received with extreme amazement the statements Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of the UN Special Commission, made to CNN on 15 February 1994.

In these statements, Ekeus gave the impression that Iraq continues to withhold part of the information pertaining to chemical weapons. As a matter of fact, Ekeus has made it clear in letters addressed to me that Iraq has provided the required information regarding its previous programs, that this information is credible and comprehensive, and that it is sufficient for the purposes of the UN Special Commission, as enshrined in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Hence, his recent pronouncements and statements to CNN misrepresent facts, and contradict the documents he himself has submitted to the UN Security Council.

Lt. Gen. Rashid said: It has become clear to us, particularly after Iraq accepted Resolution 715 in November 1993, that Ambassador Ekeus makes himself part of the U.S. political maneuvers which seek to prolong the unjust blockade imposed on Iraq. Therefore, he makes contradictory statements serving in fact the purpose of U.S. maneuvers.

Rashid continued: We ask the chairman of the Special Commission to shoulder his responsibilities in an objective manner, adhere to the Commission's tasks as defined by the UN Security Council resolutions, and dissociate himself from the U.S. anti-Iraq maneuvers and political pressure which has nothing to do with the Security Council resolutions.

On Ekeus statements on the effects of the blockade on the Iraqi people and his arbitrary criticism of Iraq for not implementing what he called a mechanism presented to it by the United Nations to sell a fixed amount of oil to buy food and medicine under international supervision, Rashid said: First, this subject is not within the jurisdiction of the chairman of the Special Commission. It is within the jurisdiction of the UN general secretariat. Second, Ekeus wants to dissociate himself from being largely responsible for continuing the blockade imposed on Iraq and hence the continuation of the Iraqi people's suffering. This is because under U.S. pressure, Ekeus is reluctant to tell the truth which he knows only too well; namely, that Iraq has abided by UN resolutions. Had he possessed the courage and objectivity required from an international official, he would have presented his report on this issue to the Security Council, thus, leading to the implementation of Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 and ending the Iraqi peoples suffering. The blame he levels at Iraq because it rejects arrangements that infringe on its sovereignty and dignity is blatantly ridiculous.

Foreign Minister Claims Total Compliance With Resolution 687

*JN1902202694 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio
Network in Arabic 1900 GMT 19 Feb 94*

[Text] Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf has asserted that Iraq has complied with Security Council Resolution 687 on weapons of mass destruction and no longer has any of these weapons or the capacity to manufacture them.

In a statement to Qatari state television last night, he said that although Iraq implemented the provisions of that resolution, it is repeatedly accused of failure to abide by international resolutions for political reasons and to maintain the blockade imposed on it.

He added that U.S.-led foreign parties in the Security Council have political purposes unrelated to the [Gulf] crisis.

This is the second time the Qatari television has held an interview with Iraqi officials. A week ago, it aired a report on the unjust blockade, including an interview with Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Officer Views Serb Use of Russian-Built 'Aerosol Missiles'

AU2302132994 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 18-25 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by Arif Pasalic, Brigadier-General of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina: "Aerosol Carries Death"]

[Text] The aggressor has several times, through its official representatives, announced the use of a new weapon that was supposed to speed up the achievement of the set military goal of the war. These announcements (the aim of which was to frighten) have practically been actualized already.

The enemy started using the new weapon late last month. It is an aerosol-type missile. The remains of such missiles were found above the village of Buca Potok.

The analysis of the position of the missile parts, the location of the strike, in the ballistic sense, has shown that the missile was fired from Krivoglavci.

Considering that this is a new weapon in this war, we are obliged to provide the public with specific information on what kind of weapon is in question. Aerosol explosives were first mentioned in literature as early as in 1960, and from 1966 there were practical applications of aerosol explosives in the form of bombs dropped from planes and helicopters. The term "aerosol" means a heterogeneous mixture of air and solid or liquid particles.

An aerosol explosive, in fact a mixture of volatile hydrocarbons (ethylene-oxide and propylene-oxide), and aluminum nitrate—aluminum powder—is already used in practice. Soaps are used as cohesion material. As opposed to classical solid explosives, the aerosol explosive has greater energy, chemical reactions occur more easily during the explosion process, the shock wave speed is greater, it has a lower level of super-pressure, and it has a longer-lasting effect.

These explosion characteristics allow for a greater destructive potential. During the explosion, the aerosol explosion cloud enters every gap (above the shelter, below the shelter, trees, and the shelter areas), and then explodes, the explosion being powerful and long—the wave is most frequently lethal. The shock wave destroys lungs, pierces eardrums and other organs, and the air bubbles often enter the circulatory system (stopping in the heart or brain), which causes a quick death. The shock wave of the explosion of a 200-kg aerosol warhead causes death within a 60-meter diameter.

This kind of weapon is known to be possessed by the United States (who used it in the Vietnam war), Russia, France, and Israel, and it is very likely that China has also produced them. The former JNA [Yugoslav

National Army] was interested in acquiring and producing this kind of weapon, but, despite research conducted in the institutes (Vinca), it was not possible to fully master the technology and production. Considering the most abusive way of using such explosives, in air bombs and missiles (the "FRY" has had difficulties with the production of missile fuel), it may be concluded that the weapons used did not originate, nor were they produced, on the territory of the "FRY."

To launch an aerosol-type warhead, the Serb-Chetnik aggressor forces use the Grad missile system (produced in Russia—the Soviet Union). The analysis of the remains of the missile showed that it had been produced very recently in the factories and institutes of Russia, which indicates a specific breaking of the embargo by the "FRY" and Russia. So far, some 10 such missiles have been used on the frontlines in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Judging from an analysis of past use of this weapon by the Chetnik aggressors, it is likely that they will continue to use the Grad missiles with aerosol warheads, and write primitive messages on them, as is characteristic of them, and typical of their senses and their fascist ideology ("We will fuck your mothers, you Turks").

ITAR-TASS Speculates on Origin of 'Elipton'

LD2802165994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0832 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York, 28 Feb—The American corporation "Gerardo International," which works on developing secret weapons systems for the Pentagon, thinks that Aldrich Ames, arrested last week on suspicion of spying for the former USSR and then for Russia, could have supplied Moscow with secrets of the production of a new invention of the company—the so-called "MRX" defense technology. The president of the corporation, Neil Gerardo, expressed his anxiety at this circumstance in a letter to Congressman (John Mike) (Republican, Florida), which has been made available to the ITAR-TASS office in New York.

The document notes in particular that the company's management became concerned when one of its staff in Belgium reported the details of a Reuter interview with LDRP [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in which the latter declared for the first time that Russia had an ultra-secret offensive weapon called "Elipton." The description of this mysterious weapon given by Zhirinovskiy turned out to be similar to the "MRX" defense technology developed in the "Gerardo International" laboratories.

"Our company, like many other institutions that are developing high-technology weapons systems, knew of and welcomed the actions of the U.S. Government's intelligence departments in monitoring our lines of communication, because this met the aims of national security," the letter pointed out. "Today our anxiety has

increased even more after the arrest of Aldrich Ames on suspicion of supplying secret information to Moscow. We in 'Gerardo International' have done everything possible to keep the 'MRX' production methods a secret. However, after the events that have taken place we fear that the technologies of this system have been 'blown'. We call on Congress to carry out a thorough investigation of this urgent matter. We should like to know how many people, and precisely who, have access to information on the 'MRX' production technologies."

The ITAR-TASS correspondent called a representative of "Gerardo International," but he flatly refused to comment on the letter, saying that as yet he had nothing to add to the above version.

Sarajevo Radio Reports on 'Elipton'

*AU2302141894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 94*

[Text] The press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army advises that the presence of the Russian arms has been increasing on the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefields. Beside some modified dated types of arms, some very modern arms have been arriving on this battlefield recently. At the end of January, a convoy consisting of eight trailers sent from Russia crossed onto Bosnia-Herzegovina territory near Raca, carrying arms for the needs of the aggressor's Chetnik army. The trailers contained Elipton bombs—most likely the arms that Zhirinovskiy referred to during his visit to the so-called Serbian Republic, alleging that this was the new secret weapon of great destructive power—a surface-to-air missile of unknown type, and antiaircraft guns of Russian manufacture.

When the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in April 1992, the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army disposed of three missile surface-to-air systems, namely: SA-2 [Guideline], SA-3 [GOA], and SA-6 [Gainful]. We have received confirmation from several sources that the aggressor has strengthened its antiaircraft defense over Bosnia-Herzegovina considerably and introduced missile systems that not even the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army had before the war. All these systems are of Russian manufacture, namely: SA-8 [Gecko], SA-9 [Gaskin], and SA-14 [NATO code name not known]. The SA-13 [Gopher] and SA-11 [Gadfly] also form part of the aggressor's antiaircraft defense. These systems are supported from the territory of the so-called Yugoslavia by SA-12 [Gladiator] missiles.

A new missile antiaircraft system has appeared on Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman last year that was not identified.

The presence of a giant (Cumem) 240-mm caliber mortar, whose bombs weight 130 kg, has been observed at several places throughout the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefield. The (Cumem) fires destructive chemical and nuclear bombs, which means that it does not use classic mortar grenades. Its barrel is 5.5 m long and its range is

9.5 kilometers. The giant weapon weighs 4 tonnes. This mortar was also spotted in positions around Sarajevo.

Bearing in mind the number of destroyed tanks on this battlefield and the number of tanks held by the army of the so-called Serbian Republic, it is evident that their hardware is regularly replenished. Tanks that had earlier not even formed part of the armament of the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army, for example, T-72 tanks, have appeared on this battlefield on several occasions. These tanks, which carried the colors, the markings, and the numbers of the Russian Army have also taken part in some of the battles, the press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reports.

Together with these arms, large contingents of men have been arriving who are servicing them and training members of the Chetnik artillery units. It is also well known that contingents of fully armed and equipped mercenaries are arriving on the territory of the so-called Serbian Republic at regular intervals. They are not stopped on the Russian border, nor are their equipment and arms seized, the press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reports.

CZECH REPUBLIC

General Nekvasil Details Amount of Army Equipment Destroyed

*AU2302161894 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
19 Feb 94 p 3*

["(gl)"]-signed report: "Some 606 Tanks Have Already Been Destroyed"]

[Text] Prague—Gen. J. Nekvasil, chief of the Czech Army General Staff, has informed a RUDE PRAVO reporter that, by the end of January, the Czech Army had already destroyed 606 tanks, 583 armored vehicles, 621 artillery systems, and 28 combat aircraft. He said that the army is destroying this surplus hardware on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. He added that owing to the reorganization of the units, the army will have to transfer 177,500 tonnes of equipment this year using roughly 7,780 railroad freightcars.

SLOVAKIA

International Inspection Team Visits Sliac Air Base

AU1802072794 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 10 Feb 94 p 2

["(hn)"]-signed report: "They Are Destroying Aircraft"]

[Text] A three-member international inspection team, led by Maj. M. Havel, an air force expert from Canada, yesterday visited the Sliac Airfield, home of the 1st Slovak Army Air Base. They were interested in the military hardware destined for destruction. The aircraft were next, after the tanks, artillery hardware, and armored combat vehicles. Five type SU-7 aircraft, which were transferred to Sliac last year from Prerov, are to be destroyed. They are being destroyed in accordance with the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

PRAVDA Commentary on START II, Uranium Sale*PM1602141794 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Feb 94 p 5*

[Article by Col. Petr Belov: "About Missiles, Their Uranium, and Targeting Information"]

[Text] As an independent expert on systems safety engineering I cannot fail to share my fears at the latest "gift" to the Russian people from the munificence of the presidents who gathered in Moscow at the start of the year. Let me remind you that a year previously there was a similar "gift" in the form of the hasty signing of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms—START II—which, even before it was ratified, had played a pernicious role for us. Here I shall dwell only on the latest new "partnership" initiatives which develop this treaty: the nontargeting of strategic missiles against each other, Ukraine's complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, and the United States' purchase of Russian weapons-grade uranium.

I think there is no better guarantee of stability under present conditions than the certainty of our potential for not leaving an aggressor unpunished. The correctness of my thoughts is confirmed not only by the lessons of history but also by the recent conclusions of the international conference in Rio de Janeiro, the statements by U.S. Vice President A. Gore, and the research of Academician N. Amosov. In that light you cannot help concluding that the agreements concluded in Moscow recently on the military-economic aspects of cooperation are similar in form and anti-Russian in content. Their danger lies in definitively depriving Russia of the potential for deterrence, in selling off for a song what belongs to its future generations.

Retargeting of Missiles

Perhaps this is the most effective confirmation (for the uninitiated) of partnership relations between the former adversaries. Here there is a political dividend for all presidents at the same time and (although extremely implausible) a reduction in the gravity of the consequences of the unsanctioned launch of any missile: Its lethal charge will merely fall into the ocean or onto an uninhabited island. It is emphasized, it is true, that it is hardly possible to control the targeting information of modern strategic missiles and consequently this initiative is allegedly utterly "innocuous."

In reality everything will depend on the energy of the "partners'" political leadership and the degree of resistance to that initiative from military professionals. After all, only they know the other side: the loss of combat readiness is more dangerous to the victim than to the aggressor; mistakes and disruptions during retargeting are fraught with an excessive risk of accidents; the computing of missiles' new targeting information and

the replacement of old ones give rise to colossal expenditure; the vigilance and responsibility of the combat crew on duty with "untargeted" missiles are reduced; and the actions of these crews when they receive a combat order becomes drastically more complicated. All this as a whole casts doubt on certainty as regards our combat readiness.

If this initiative is implemented Russia loses in the combat readiness of its multiple-warhead silo-based missiles considerable more than the United States. At least several minutes essential to re-record the "cancelled" targeting information. With our missiles' more radical "retargeting," which is indicated by the quite protracted deadline for its implementation (nearly five months) tens of minutes, if not hours, will be required to restore their combat readiness. In all cases our strategic nuclear forces could be deprived of their deterrent role in a retaliatory counter-strike, the only kind of strike acceptable to us, and will then be destroyed if necessary by high-precision, diversionary or other weapons.

In contrast to us, the U.S. side remains in a more advantageous position. After all, its combat might is based on high-precision cruise missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. To all appearances it is not proposed to retarget the former and it is pointless to retarget the latter: They are already continuously and automatically retargeted in the process of combat patrol. It is virtually impossible to deprive them of this potential, still less to monitor the removal of targeting information from naval missiles.

You ask: Why was the United States previously skeptical about our statement on the nontargeting of Russian missiles on U.S. territory but is now itself coming out with a similar initiative? I think the reason here lies in the sincere readiness of present-day Russia's top political echelons to undertake unilateral disarmament. Nor is there any doubt that a gamble is being taken on the military's impotence: After all, it was the Russian Federation Defense Ministry leaders and above all the Strategic Rocket Forces who unconditionally agreed to the "destabilizing" role of our multiple-warhead silo-based missiles in favor of single-warhead mobile missiles.

Ukraine's Disarmament

The surprising attention paid toward the problem of "Ukrainian" nuclear weapons, including by the new U.S. President, is generated by the same overtly expressed U.S. desire for absolute military superiority but not through its own arms upgrading but through the weakening of potential adversaries. It is Ukraine's obstinacy over adopting nuclear-free status and, worse, its intention to keep 46 of the most modern multiple-warhead silo-based SS-24 missiles with 460 warheads which are not only preventing the destruction of similar Russian SS-18 missiles under START II but are also casting doubt on the U.S. THAAD antimissile program (a cheap SDI).

With the United States' present unconditional supremacy in offensive arms both conventional and nuclear, it also wants to have a guaranteed antimissile defense. The multiple-warhead silo-based missiles are an obstacle. Even the full-scale SDI, never mind its truncated version, cannot intercept their numerous warheads. The missiles on our submarines and the single-warhead SS-25 missiles are another matter: They have a minimal chance even of flying since as a result of their lack of defense they could easily be destroyed beforehand on their patrol routes or at the points of permanent deployment. If some of them do survive they will be able to take off only one after another and there will be very few of them (no more than 100) so the United States needs only a relatively cheap ground-based ABM system—in other words the last stage of SDI geared to the destruction of up to 200 nuclear missiles.

Those are the reasons for B. Clinton's entirely natural interest in Ukrainian nuclear status and the United States' as yet unrealized wish to review the two first articles of the 1972 ABM treaty formally banning the creation of even a restricted territorial ABM system. Thus very few obstacles are left on the path toward undivided rule and absolute impunity for any actions.

America's position can be understood but is unacceptable, not only to Russia and Ukraine, but also to the rest of the world. There are at least two reasons for this: The satisfaction of U.S. ambitions will not increase stability in the world and, if it does not immediately plunge the world into fresh anarchy, will at any rate make it violent. The U.S. pragmatists' cynicism is striking: After all, they intend to implement the United States' attainment of absolute military supremacy and its own safety at other people's expenses, primarily at Russian expense.

What lies behind their impudent treatment of "sovereign Ukraine?" The removal of its natural right to choose the minimum necessary and effective strategic deterrent means will hardly be compensated for by illusory economic and military guarantees. The billion promised for weapons-grade uranium plus the further two billion in the form of possible IMF credits will hardly resurrect its economy. Expectations for an even greater reduction by the Russian side of prices for energy carriers exported for the Ukrainians are also obviously naive: Prices on the world market have already been made as cheap as possible through the zeal of the Americans.

Uranium Deal

But however paradoxical it may seem, the most destructive thing for Russia will be its "breakthrough" to the market in enriched uranium, where the Americans have always ruled. Nor will they lose out this time. If Russia received 12 billion for 500 tonnes of uranium sold to the United States, the Americans as a result will pocket at least 300 billion—such is the profitability of this "deal of the century." After all, the main second-hand dealer under the contract is the "Enrichment Corporation"

firm, which has retained the right to review the terms of the deal annually, naturally in the direction of reducing the purchase price.

Most striking of all was official Moscow's agreement to the long term nature of this contract. After all, it is already known that at present world extraction rates the stocks of natural uranium, oil, and gas are sufficient for 50 years. Nor do we have guarantees of the development of thermonuclear energy and plutonium reactors. Having lost two thirds of its uranium sources with the collapse of the USSR, Russia is now selling nearly all its released weapons-grade uranium?! Without uranium nuclear electric power stations you will not get far with coal, logs, and hydroelectric power stations.

The actual atmosphere in which the "uranium deal" was prepared and the interpretation of this agreement for the public are also interesting. Nuclear Power Minister V. Mikhaylov, who explained to the Americans the figures for the quantity of weapons-grade uranium we have and the number of nuclear warheads, took a most active part in creating a halo of "dire necessity" around this step. Since the revised figures exceeded estimates so far available by approximately 50 percent, this was reflected in a reduction of purchase prices for uranium. Having bought it the Americans will be able right now to resell the uranium at three to five times the price, and what will the price be in 20 years?

Nor can we fail to note one more aspect of this affair—its link with our unilateral disarmament under START II. Russia's selling off of its uranium will have a deplorable effect on international stability. After all, even potentially Russia will be deprived of the opportunity to play a deterrent role since it will be unable to step up its nuclear potential in the event of a drastic aggravation of the situation. And who will guarantee that the need for this step will not be provoked by Washington itself, for instance, as a result of its unilateral rejection of ABM restrictions? In contrast to us, the United States retains its weapons-grade plutonium together with nuclear warheads and the platforms for them.

As a result the "uranium deal" will deprive our heirs of fuel for nuclear power engineering, no alternative to which can yet be seen, leaving in exchange mountains of radioactive waste.

I am sure that Russia does not need such bilateral and trilateral agreements. Their time passed with the collapse of the USSR, when it was possible and necessary to agree with the United States "as equals." With present realities, with the existence of only one superpower, all the others must be concerned for their own self-preservation autonomously or by cooperating. Russia and Ukraine need an independent military technology policy: We cannot do without the minimum necessary number of multiple-warhead silo-based missiles. We must preserve and modernize the existing 50 Ukrainian SS-24 missiles and 200 Russian SS-18 missiles together, helping each other.

I should like our parliaments to find the time to investigate and look into the results promised to us by the results of the Moscow meeting of presidents. I think the way out of the situation which is taking shape lies in the unification of the fraternal Slav and other peoples who have lived together since time immemorial in the face of the now real threat of their "depersonalization" and extinction and the "Europeanization" and "Americanization" of their natural resources. Instead of fueling passions over the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory we must render Ukraine aid in ensuring their safeguarding and, if we are asked, in preserving some part of them. After all, we are also in extreme need of Ukraine's assistance in maintaining the combat readiness of the heavy Russian SS-18 missiles.

Russia's all-around cooperation with Ukraine in the military and economic fields is mutually advantageous. Our countries will become richer and stronger as a result. And with the good-neighborliness of powers like ours things will be more peaceful for others too—the peoples know that.

Yeltsin, Major Issue Statement on Nuclear Missiles

*LD1502125894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1227 GMT 15 Feb 94*

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow February 15 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and John Major, prime minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, issued a joint statement here on Tuesday.

The statement reads as follows:

- Reaffirming the fundamental importance of the two countries' partnership relations, based on the treaty, dated November 9, 1992, on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom,
- emphasizing that the two countries' cooperation in the efforts to strengthen European and global security and build non-confrontational international relations is the basic element of these partnership relations,
- basing themselves on the discussions of nuclear issues by the two sides and proceeding from a desire to make a tangible contribution to strengthening strategic stability in the world, the president of the Russian Federation and the prime minister of the United Kingdom are stating that they will issue the necessary instructions on mutual non-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles which are under their respective command, so that the missile could be non-targeted not later than May 30, 1994.

So, the day-to-day control over the nuclear forces of the two sides will be exercised in keeping with the mutual

recognition of the fact that the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom are not adversaries.

Disarmament Negotiator Comments After Talks in Kiev

*MK1202104094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
12 Feb 94 p 2*

[Pavel Felgengauer report under the "Talks" rubric: "Russian-Ukrainian Nuclear Missile Marathon Continues. Kiev Is Ready To Get Rid of the Weapons, but After Some Bargaining"]

[Text] This week a high-ranking delegation including Yuriy Dubinin, special envoy and chief of the Russian Federation state delegation to talks with Ukraine; Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov; and Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, from the 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry, held difficult talks in Kiev on specific measures to eliminate Ukrainian nuclear weapons.

Upon returning to Moscow, Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin told your SEGODNYA correspondent that "we have agreed on the content of the document that will enable us to implement the agreements on eliminating nuclear arms in Ukraine, which were reached by Presidents Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Clinton on 14 January." Presently, the results of the talks are being "reported" to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia. According to official reports, however, President Yeltsin has caught a cold and is currently inaccessible.

Meanwhile, the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed that until the results achieved in Kiev are approved, no details about the process of the talks should be made public. No press conferences. It was disclosed, however, that they had "entirely substantive talks in Kiev" that were held in "a constructive and businesslike atmosphere." Translated from diplomatic-speak into plain language, this usually means a tough showdown.

The Kiev military and political establishment had long ago decided in principle to get rid of what it sees as costly, dangerous, and rather useless nuclear weapons, but the bargaining over the deal's specifics is set to be long and tedious.

Russia Stops Fuel Deliveries to Ukraine To Force Disarmament

*MK1102095094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Feb 94 p 2*

[Yuriy Aleksandrov report in the "In Brief" column]

[Text] Kiev—Ukraine's nuclear power industry is on the verge of stopping. Nuclear fuel stocks at nuclear power plants are running out while fresh supplies from Russia have been stopped as of the beginning of this year. The TVEL concern, Russia's sole producer of nuclear power

fuel, cites the ban by the State Committee for Supervision over the Safety of Work in Industry and Atomic Power Engineering [Gosatomnadzor]. The latter for its part points to the expiration at the end of last year of a corresponding interstate Russian-Ukrainian agreement. The problem has grown from purely economic into a political one. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed its Ukrainian colleagues that deliveries of nuclear fuel may be resumed only if Ukraine accedes to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The Kiev leadership has asked Chernomyrdin to lift restrictions on nuclear fuel deliveries from Russia. It is hardly accidental that the conflict has flared up during the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament in Kiev. It seems that the Russian side decided to play a trump which can effectively shut down Ukraine's nuclear power industry.

RUSSIA

Developments in Mirzayanov CW Case

CW Official Interviewed

94WC0029A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Professor Aleksandr Gorbovskiy, chief of the department for issues of chemical weapons of the Committee for Convention-Related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents Andrey Vaganov and Rodion Nikolayev, under the rubric "Position"; place and date not given: "Russia Has Not Violated Any Treaties on Chemical Weapons. As Far as Destroying These Weapons, It Is as Difficult as Creating Them"]

[Text] One year ago, Russia was among the first countries to sign in Paris the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. This event completed the proceedings of more than two decades of negotiations at the disarmament conference in Geneva.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons which is headquartered in the Hague (the Netherlands) was created in order to carry out the convention and implement an international control mechanism. In Russia, the Committee on Convention-Related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons was also created in 1992 by an edict of the Russian Federation president. The committee was charged with the functions of coordination and control in the area of ensuring compliance with Russia's international obligations concerning the ban on chemical and biological weapons. Professor Aleksandr Gorbovskiy, chief of the department for the issues of chemical weapons of the committee, answers questions put by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, what is the status of implementing the convention as of today?

Gorbovskiy: The convention has been signed. A period of two years has been set for participating countries to be able to ratify it and prepare to meet their obligations. The convention will take effect when no fewer than 65 states ratify it.

The convention has now been signed by 154 states, but ratified by only four countries, which do not have chemical weapons and which actually do not have to assume any obligations. This is a very serious problem for other countries that do have such weapons: The conditions and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons need to be created.

The main proportion of the world stockpiles of such weapons are concentrated in the United States and Russia. This is why the issue of destroying chemical weapons is the most acute for these two states.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What does the Russian chemical weapons complex amount to? One finds absolutely contradictory information in the press.

Gorbovskiy: The Russian chemical weapons complex means first of all the stockpiles kept at storage facilities. The total quantity of the stockpiles has been declared and comes to 40,000 tonnes of toxic substances (OV).

Russia also has facilities for the production of toxic substances. The principal facilities are in Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk (Chuvashia).

Last year an interdepartmental commission whose task it was to inspect all storage facilities for toxic substances verified the reliability of chemical weapons storage and provisions for the safety of the population. As chairman of the above commission, I can confirm the number given—40,000 tonnes.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: Is it possible to say what the qualitative composition of these 40,000 tonnes is, and in which regions Russian chemical weapons are mostly located?

Gorbovskiy: The most up-to-date nerve substances—sarin, soman, and V-gas [vi-gaz], account for approximately 32,000 tonnes. The remainder consists of obsolete substances, mustard gas and lewisite, which have been stored since as early as the 1950's.

Data on the geography of the locations of such weapons are no longer secret. We have exchanged information with the Americans on the military-chemical facilities; the geographical coordinates of their locations precise to the second have been provided. All these facilities are located in the European section of Russia.

We have seven storage sites. Toxic substances (mustard gas, lewisite) are kept in containers at two sites. Storage is within munitions at five sites. Two storage facilities

out of these five hold missile and artillery munitions, and three storage sites—aircraft chemical munitions.

The easternmost facility is in Chelyabinsk Oblast. Those in Bryansk and Penza Oblasts are the closest to Moscow. The 40,000 tonnes are distributed among these storage facilities approximately evenly—at 5,000-7,000 tonnes per storage site.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What is the guaranteed shelf life of chemical munitions?

Gorbovskiy: More than 80 percent of toxic substances are found within munitions whose bodies ensure their reliable storage. The inspection of arsenals revealed that a case of leakage has not been registered at any of them recently.

American chemical munitions have thinner shells. This is precisely why their chemical munitions have become disabled sooner. For example, rocket artillery munitions "leaked" by the mid-1970's. The Americans were forced to encase them in concrete and dump them in the ocean.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What is 40,000 tonnes equal to in terms of, so to say, destruction coefficient?

Gorbovskiy: A lethal dose of V-gas, the most up-to-date chemical toxic agent, comes to 10 milligrams per person. This is a virtually invisible aerosol particle. It is easy to calculate the number of potential victims by simple division if we know the total stockpiles of chemical weapons. However, this would be an incompetent calculation; it does not take into account actual conditions for the use of all weapons. For example, if we compare how much explosive was used during World War II and the number of people who were destroyed, it will turn out that there were hundreds of kilograms of trinitrotoluene per person killed.

The same is the case in the event of combat use of chemical weapons—kilograms and tens of kilograms of toxic substances per each casualty. Approximately the same casualty rate should also be reckoned with during accidents.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What are the specifics of Russian problems associated with implementation of the provisions of the convention?

Gorbovskiy: Unfortunately we have to begin work in the area of chemical weapons destruction virtually from scratch. After the former USSR announced the discontinuation of chemical weapons production (1987), a facility for the destruction of toxic substances was created in the vicinity of the city of Chapayevsk within a very short period of time. About 100 million rubles in 1989 prices were spent to this end.

However, this facility was not commissioned, after all. The local population protested strongly. Technologies that were supposed to be used at the facility were evaluated to be safer than American technologies even

by specialists from the United States. Many other industrial enterprises are located in Chapayevsk, and the ecological situation in the region was very strained. There was absolutely no opportunity to coordinate the commissioning of the facility with the local authorities and the public.

Subsequently, major studies were done to develop a draft of the state program for the destruction of chemical weapons. As a result, specialists came to the conclusion that it would be safest and most economical to use for destruction available former facilities for the production of toxic substances; after all, in this case the entire infrastructure did not have to be created from scratch. In particular, a plant in the city of Novocheboksarsk was proposed (the V-gas toxic substance had been produced there previously). However, following discussion of a draft program at the beginning of last year, the legislative organ of Chuvashia made a decision which ruled out the use of the Novocheboksarsk Production Association Khimprom for the purpose of destroying a proportion of the stock of chemical weapons.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What is the price tag on the program for the destruction of chemical weapons?

Gorbovskiy: It is very expensive—a few trillion rubles. The following concept is now taking shape: Chemical weapons will have to be destroyed directly in the area of the facilities at which they are stored. A major effort to coordinate all issues with the local organs of power and the public lies ahead.

In conjunction with this, certain articles of an instigatory and even intimidating nature seriously harm an objective assessment of the situation. Thus, one year ago articles appeared in the newspapers of the Republic of Chuvashia about V-gas contamination in a 30-kilometer zone around Novocheboksarsk. The interdepartmental commission dispatched there for a survey did not confirm this fact. Analysis of the samples of various media made in specialized laboratories indicated an absence of contamination.

One more dangerous trend has begun to manifest itself—to combine the program for the destruction of chemical weapons with the resolution of ecological problems associated with the operation of industry as such. All this causes the program to become still more expensive. As a result, a situation might develop in which Russia will be simply unable to carry out the program on time. Meanwhile, according to the convention, the first facility for the destruction of toxic substances should already be in operation two years after the convention is ratified. In five years, 20 percent of the chemical weapons should be destroyed, in seven years—50 percent, and in 10 years—100 percent.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: More than a year ago MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published the notorious article by Vil Mirzoyanov and Lev Fedorov "Poisoned Politics." The trial of one of the authors of the article began on Monday. He stands accused of divulging state

secrets with regard to the development of a new type of chemical weapon in our country. Could you comment on the situation?

Gorbovskiy: At one point I, as a representative of the Committee on Convention-Related Problems, provided explanations at a briefing concerning charges by Mirzoyanov and Fedorov that Russia is violating the international obligations it has assumed. I confirm officially that Russia has not violated any international agreements in the area of the ban on chemical weapons, either at the time this article was written or at present.

Since the production of toxic substances was discontinued in 1987, by the USSR, it has not resumed; the plants were either mothballed or their output mix was changed. I am certain that the American side is also well aware of this: U.S. specialists have visited former Russian facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Besides, there are satellite monitoring systems. Incidentally, the Americans themselves, precisely in 1987, embarked on the industrial manufacturing of binary weapons—the outcome of the program for modernizing their chemical weapons. It is precisely binary chemical weapons that are the hardest to control within the framework of the convention.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: What can you say about the charges that new types of chemical weapons are being developed in Russia? Does the fact that the Novichok-5 new chemical agent has been developed conform to the truth?

Gorbovskiy: This problem falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation rather than our committee. Legally, not a single state is banned from such activities at present. This ban will only apply to countries that have ratified the convention once it takes effect.

It is known that research on binary chemical weapons has been conducted in many countries. The experience gained by chemical scientists is now being used to create international monitoring mechanisms. Besides, the length of time between a reaction in a test tube and the creation of weapons is many years or even decades.

If disclosure of information on methods for the generation of toxic substances has occurred, this is undoubtedly a dangerous path leading to the uncontrollable spread of chemical weapons and the emergence of chemical terrorism.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: The article "Poisoned Politics" was written by two authors—Mirzoyanov [spelling of name as published] and Fedorov. Nonetheless, at present only Mirzoyanov is on trial. What is this about?

Gorbovskiy: As far as I know, Mirzoyanov worked with secret information at the GosNIIOKhT [State Union Scientific-Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology] and, naturally, signed a pledge not to

divulge state secrets. This is why charges were filed against him. As far as Fedorov is concerned, he proclaims that he has never read secret documents anywhere nor has he signed any pledges.

This begs the following question: What does Fedorov stand for as a specialist? Here is the opinion of him by scientists who know his past activities well.

Lev Fedorov received his college education at the department of chemistry of Moscow State University while being the party organizer of the class, with all requisite privileges for study existing at the time. Subsequently, there was graduate study and defense of a candidate dissertation. However, some time later it came out that the results of his work could not be confirmed. His science adviser experienced major unpleasantness because of that.

The first defense of a doctoral dissertation by Fedorov before the Learned Council of the imeni A.N. Nesmeyanov Institute of Element-Organic Compounds failed for an altogether simple reason—plagiarism. Scientific statements which the author passed off as his turned out to have been borrowed from the works of domestic and foreign scientists.

Several years ago, having failed to achieve particular scientific success, Lev Fedorov suddenly took an intense interest in dioxins (organic compounds containing chlorine which are the byproducts of certain chemical production processes and pose a certain danger to humans). Lacking his own scientific-practical works on this issue at the time, Fedorov nonetheless mounted vigorous activities in this area. Mistaking him for a dioxin specialist, the scientific community of the city of Ufa invited Fedorov to participate in the development of the Republic Program for the Evaluation of Dioxin Contamination of the Natural Environment in 1992. Strangely, this specialist did not make any practically significant proposals, and refused to serve on the commission after the very first meeting.

Undoubtedly, incompetent people such as Lev Fedorov should not be commenting on an important area such as the problem of chemical disarmament.

More on Uglev CW Charges, Mirzayanov Case

94WC0026A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian No 5, Feb 94 [Signed to press 1 Feb 94] pp 4-6

[Article by Igor Ryabov under the rubric "NOVOYE VREMYA Investigation": "Chemical War Against an Invisible Enemy"]

[Text] Scientist-chemist Vladimir Uglev has threatened to make public the formula of a secret chemical weapon. Will he end up in jail like Vil Mirzayanov?

The fate of Vil Mirzayanov was decided not only in the room of the Moscow City Court. A familiar scenario of the 1930's: "The sun is shining in the sky, a nightingale chirps," while in the cell of the Sailors' Rest prison the

intellectual face of a scientist-chemist rubs against the stubble of hardened criminals.

The court that issued the ruling sending Vil Mirzayanov to the Sailor's Rest investigative facility is considered independent. As Aleksandr Asnis, the attorney for the accused, said, neither public appeals, of which there were plenty throughout last year, nor the opinion of presidential advisers can influence it.

Vil Mirzayanov met with these advisers often. In the spring of 1993 he talked, for instance, to Viktor Ryurikov. The latter felt sorry for him, was perplexed, but could do nothing.

Aleksandr Asnis believes that the opinions of highly placed people can only influence the sentence. Only Russia's General Procurator Aleksey Kazannik can cancel the trial. If he finds proof of its illegality.

The entire world already is talking about the court's illegality. Only those who are trying to legitimize it remain silent and hide.

In Bed With a Criminal

On Sunday 30 January only one problem tormented Nuriya Mirzayanova: How to get a parcel with personal items and food to her husband in prison. Sailor's Rest is famous not only for its horrible conditions, but also to get a parcel in one must spend many hours getting permission and wait equally long in line. Parcels are accepted only from members of the immediate family. Nuriya could not go to the prison—she had a serious case of flu which she caught from her six-year-old son.

During the arrest, Vil Mirzayanov did not take anything to prison with him except his regular clothes. And so he stood in the cell wearing a regular suit and shoes, unable to change or warm up. Yes—stood, since seven people were in the cell with four beds. They had to take turns to sleep. Vil Mirzayanov had not have a chance to lie down for 24 hours after he had been brought to this "four-bed suite."

The scientist was arrested at noon on 27 January. In the evening his attorney informed the press that his client was locked up in Sailor's Rest. At first Vil Mirzayanov was placed in a large cell with many criminals. Only later was he transferred to a smaller cell.

The putschists and organizers of the "red rebellion," who caused a massacre in Moscow, are "resting" in respectable Lefortovo—the triumph of democracy. While a scientist who told the world of secret violations of international agreements by the military ended up in the category of especially dangerous criminals. Only military orders are carried out with such zeal.

Attorney Aleksandr Asnis advised Vil Mirzayanov to petition the court to be released from prison on the pledge that he would unfailingly attend all court hearings. It was because of the scientist's failure to appear at the Moscow City Court that he was thrown into the harshest investigative facility as punishment.

Nuriya Mirzayanova was certain that her husband would hold on to the end. He never succumbed to the anticonstitutional court. From the very beginning Vil Mirzayanov said that the trial was a violation of the Constitution, since the latter prohibits the charging of citizens on the basis of unpublished legal acts.

A Rare Triumph for Sensible Arguments

The Russian Federation Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry—the official plaintiff—accuses Vil Mirzayanov of disclosing state secrets in an article and interview published at the end of 1992 in the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and NOVOYE VREMYA weeklies.

The prosecution considered information about the secret development of a new chemical weapon in Russia a state secret. Vil Mirzayanov did not want to accept that violations of the international convention banning chemical warfare would remain a "state secret" in his country.

As is known, though, no such list of secrets exists, and the notion itself is very vague. According to Article 15, Point 3 of the Russian Constitution, these published materials cannot serve as grounds for initiating court proceedings against Vil Mirzayanov. So what is he "charged" with, and so energetically at that?

An episode that is characteristic of Mirzayanov's case occurred in his apartment on 25 January. That evening he was visited by two militiamen armed with Kalashnikov rifles. They asked the scientist to gather his belongings, referring to the order of the precinct officer. They were unable to take him with them, though. Nuriya Mirzayanova discovered that the summons to the court, which was the pretext for the visit, indicated the time as 1030 the next morning.

The more senior man at first threatened to use force, but was persuaded not to do so. He spent a long time arguing on the phone with the precinct chief—the latter insisted that the order be carried out... As they left, the servant of law and order who disobeyed his boss was almost apologizing to the apartment owners. When the militia left, Vil Mirzayanov went to stay overnight with his daughter.

This is how Vil Mirzayanov fought arbitrariness, hoping for common sense on the part of those who were carrying out the will of... Who?

A New Character

On 15 January the government newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published an article signed by Igor Vlasov, member of the Committee on Convention-Related Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Igor Vlasov dismissed the scientists' reports that chemical weapons were being developed in Russia.

His statement was a good demonstration of the meaning of the word "dismissed," so categorical were Igor Vlasov's contentions.

The Committee on Convention-Related Problems was created by a directive of the president. It is headed by Anatoliy Kuntsevich, an academician and major general. Prior to this, Anatoliy Kuntsevich served as the commander of the chemical test site in Shikhany in Saratov Oblast where, as local public organizations maintain, chemical weapons are still being stored and tested.

Last year Boris Yeltsin issued a number of directives on procedures for carrying out the program of destruction of chemical weapons. In October, Anatoliy Kuntsevich and Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, chief of the radiation, chemical, and biological defense troops, visited Shikhany. Anatoliy Kuntsevich did not keep secret his opinion that there was no better place for such destruction than the Shikhany test site.

In December 1993 it was announced that Germany had given Saratov Oblast a gift of a mobile laboratory for monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons.

The incidence of eye cancer is higher in Shikhany than anywhere else. This indicates the strength of the effect of organic phosphorus accumulated there.

Incidences of various types of cancer are twice as high in this area than the all-Russia average.

Vladimir Uglev is a former senior researcher at an institute where chemical weapons were developed. The institute is located in Volsk, a few kilometers from Shikhany. NOVOYE VREMYA readers know this from an interview he gave at the beginning of 1993. Vladimir Uglev worked on the development and synthesis of chemical weapons for 15 years. He confirmed the allegations of Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov that Russia continues to work on the development of chemical weapons.

In February of last year the Saratov Oblast procuracy initiated criminal proceedings against him. For the same reason as the case against Vil Mirzayanov. At first, Vladimir Uglev was treated as a witness, but then investigator Nikolay Strilets decided that the chemist told too much to NOVOYE VREMYA.

By then the investigation in Mirzayanov's case had been completed and was ready to go to trial. Uglev was luckier: There had not been enough time to compile a dossier on him.

On 24 January of this year Vladimir Uglev warned that he would make public "formulae and names of toxic substances, the methods of their production and field applications" that Russia had not disclosed when it signed the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Vladimir Uglev took this step in order to attract the president's attention to the situation in Shikhany. A new character had come on the scene in Moscow's "chemical war."

Instead, the Kerosene Was 'Peddled' to Tractor Drivers

In Vladimir Uglev's opinion, Igor Vlasov's assurances that "chemical conversion" is proceeding normally are a deception. "Before doing anything," says the member of the Committee on Convention-Related Problems, "we will make the public aware of the plans for destruction." Vladimir Uglev, however, maintains that the sites for chemical weapons destruction have already been selected. They are Shikhany and the Gornyy settlement.

"I am not against the destruction of toxic agents," said Vladimir Uglev during his meeting with the NOVOYE VREMYA correspondent. "But it should be done differently than is currently the case."

Vladimir Uglev is convinced that in Shikhany chemical waste is still being dumped into pits and chemical-weapon ammunition and is detonated without any measurements being performed.

"Three years ago they dumped a cistern of Yperite into a pit the same way. There was an order to burn it, but the soldiers decided to save kerosene. Such facts can only be proven by continuous monitoring. The military say that when measurements are done, instruments detect substances dating back quite a few years."

There are special sites for the destruction of regular munitions. In Shikhany, explosions are routine. As a specialist, Vladimir Uglev can see the actual the content of a charge:

"There is a thick cloud typical of toxic substances that floats after an explosion."

A-232

Vladimir Uglev promised to talk about the secret substance on 4 February in the event his appeals to the president regarding the situation in Shikhany proved futile. He assured that he would only talk about a weapon he personally worked on, although he has knowledge of many secret substances. NOVOYE VREMYA was able to obtain brief information from Vladimir Uglev on the substance he worked on.

Specialists call it A-232. It was discovered about 20 years ago. Its effect is more powerful than that of the well-known VX nerve gas. Apparently, A-232 belongs to the class of paralyzing gases, since it is being compared to an agent of this class.

Had Vladimir Uglev revealed the A-232 formula, he would have learned about a hundred substances of this family. The most potent analogs were discovered immediately when the basic "skeleton" formula was invented. After that, scientists only did screening, trying various

components to fit the basic structure. There are more than 10 ways of producing A-232.

It is easy for the military to shield A-232 from the convention's provisions. It consists only of combat toxic agents, but there is nothing to keep the Russian military from putting together such a classification that would make the part on "combat toxic agents" incomplete.

The command of the chemical defense troops has defined six types of "combat toxic agents": sarin, soman, VX, Yperite, lewisite, Yperite-lewisite mix, and CS. But the domestic classification also includes "special," "training," and "reserve" toxic agents. Many of them are studied as "weapons of foreign armies." Among them are, for instance, various toxins.

"Reserve" substances have special status. They are not classified as weapons, but may be used as such. One of them—phosgene—is used in the production of pesticides and dyes and is produced in large quantities in several Russian cities. In Dneprodzerzhinsk alone, 48.5 tonnes of phosgene are produced annually.

There is no guarantee that after the disclosures A-232 will not be classified as a "special," "training," or "reserve" toxic agent.

A Desperate Step

On 29 January at 1100 Vladimir Uglev met with the president's national security adviser Yuriy Baturin. The keeper of the A-232 secret was so satisfied with the conversation that he confessed immediately afterward that... he had not intended to make the secret formula public.

He forfeited this plan after Yuriy Baturin promised him he would do everything possible not only with respect to the Shikhany test site but also regarding Vil Mirzayanov, having informed him that the question of releasing the scientist from Sailor's Rest had been discussed "at the highest level." He expressed the hope that the latter would soon be leaving the preliminary detention facility.

As an afterthought, the "blackmailer" Vladimir Uglev told NOVOYE VREMYA a little later:

"I still reserve the right to name the formula if something happens to Vil Mirzayanov."

Mirzayanov himself does not share Vladimir Uglev's intent to threaten a disclosure of the secret substance's formula. Nuriya Mirzayanova also asked Vladimir Uglev to not connect his statement with her husband's trial under any circumstances.

In any case, the Moscow "chemical bomb" may not have exploded yet, but it is certainly already charged. It may explode in Vladimir Uglev's revelations, or in Sailor's Rest, or at the "highest level." Mind you, the destruction of already produced chemical weapons is a delicate and costly undertaking.

Commentary on Case, CW History

Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Igor Tsarev and Oleg Zolotov: "The 'Chemical Bomb' Is About To Explode: It Is Easier To Cope With Obstinate Scientists, Evidently, Than With Lethal Weapons"]

[Text] Last week was marked by a new scandal around the "Mirzayanov affair." We would remind our readers that this story has already been going on for more than two years. And it started with the fact that two doctors of chemical science—Lev Fedorov and Vil Mirzayanov, sincerely believing, apparently, in democratic changes (the affair took place soon after the failure of the August putsch), placed an article in one of the Moscow newspapers about the fact that our military is continuing to create and test binary chemical weapons. In a year a similar article by the same authors appeared in another newspaper. At this point the scientists were accused of divulging a state secret. Vil Mirzayanov was thrown into Lefortovo prison. An investigation began. However, under the pressure of public opinion the Ministry of Security nevertheless released the professor after 10 days...

Time passed. The instituted "Mirzayanov case" vanished. There was a change in the leadership of the Procuracy General, which filed an indictment at that time. Russia signed (one more time) a general agreement on chemical disarmament. A new Constitution was adopted. But the "Mirzayanov case," as before, is as alive as ever. The events of last week confirmed this.

V. MIRZAYANOV:

"A closed session of the Moscow city court, which occurred in the best traditions of the past, was held on 24 January. My lawyer declared that the case lacks a special purpose program of scientific research in the sphere of chemical weapons, the results of which I would allegedly divulge, and that on the grounds of Paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Basic Law a citizen cannot be subjected to criminal proceedings on the basis of normative acts not published in the open press... We requested the assignment of a new examination by experts in which independent experts could participate, inasmuch as previously it was conducted by specialists of the KGB who represented the interests of the military-industrial complex. But the court declined this petition. Then I said that I do not have a feeling of trust in 'the justice being administered,' and I refused to answer any further questions."

The action developed in the following way. On 25 January two militiamen appeared at the apartment of the scientist and ordered him to accompany them, explaining this demand by the need to deliver Mirzayanov to a court session scheduled for 1030 the following day. "So, come and get me in the morning," the professor said.

The scientist was still free Thursday morning. When we called him at home, his wife—Nuriya Mirzayanova—picked up the phone. She said that she was a little sick and that Vil Sultanovich had just gone to the pharmacy for medicine... But within an hour we were informed that he had been arrested and sent to Sailors' Rest.

It is difficult to say at this point how this story will end. But it is already obvious that there are forces that prefer to contend with the scientists, who are telling the truth, but not with the chemical weapons. It should be recalled here that the first treaty in which chemical weapons were acknowledged to be illegal was signed as far back as the last century—in 1868. And it must be noted that first conference in human history to condemn barbaric chemical weapons was conducted specifically at the initiative of Russia. If the military seriously wanted to get rid of toxic chemical agents, chemical weapons would have disappeared from the face of the earth a long time ago. But, as before, they continue to exist, continue to be perfected, and are becoming more and more dangerous for humanity.

FROM THE CHRONICLE OF CHEMICAL WARS:

- 1915. The Kaiser's Army employed poison gas against the French. Within five minutes 180 tonnes of chlorine gas were released from 6,000 cylinders. As a result, 15,000 French soldiers and officers died in terrible torment.
- 1949. The Israeli Army employed toxic chemical agents against the Egyptians.
- 1950. The United States used sarin during the war in Korea.
- 1983. The Pentagon preceded the invasion of the island of Granada with a chemical attack. American specialists even photographed the excruciating death of 2,000 islanders and transported their bodies to the United States "for further research." It can be assumed that the new binary weapon was being tested at that time.

In contrast to other countries that are not ashamed of their achievements in the sphere of development of this barbarous weapon, our state tried to conduct itself more decently, emphasizing this in every way to world public opinion. At least the statement of Soviet scientists in May 1982 should be mentioned: "Adhering strictly to the 1925 Geneva protocol, the USSR has never employed chemical weapons anywhere." What was said generally corresponded to the truth, but it does not draw the entire picture. The Soviet policy of "chemical disarmament" had a hidden bottom...

- 1987. M. Gorbachev declared at the UN that the USSR had completely stopped the production of toxic chemical agents. At that same time, final work was being conducted in Moscow, at the State Union NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Organic Chemistry and

Technology (GSNIIOKhT), on a new chemical agent that surpassed the celebrated VX gas in its sinister characteristics.

- 1991. M. Gorbachev, who became a Nobel laureate due to his peacekeeping activity, confers the Lenin Prize in the Kremlin on the creator of the Soviet "binary" weapon. Among the fathers of this terrible weapon were V. Petrunin, director of GSNIIOKhT, and General A. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of the Chemical Troops.
- 1992. The president of the Russian Federation declares that Russia supports the agreement with the United States on the nonproduction and destruction of chemical weapons. But the committee working on problems of chemical weapons destruction that was established at that time was headed by... the father of the country's "binary" weapon, A. Kuntsevich. It is not very surprising that this same "binary" weapon was soon undergoing tests at the secret proving ground Ustyurt (near the city of Nukus).

Against the background of contradictory facts (plus the story about Professor Mirzayanov), talk about "total chemical disarmament" has to be taken with a large dose of skepticism. It will be recalled that not one previous international convention destroyed chemical weapons. On the contrary, they became even more lethal, increasing destructive power thousands of times. But as for the planned destruction of toxic chemical agents... From time to time in any army, tanks, aircraft, rockets... are written off and destroyed. For example, the dismantling and salvaging of general purpose munitions (mines, projectiles, bombs, torpedoes, etc.) is taking place in Russia as soon as their useful life expires. According to some data there are 1.2 million tonnes of such combat charges at bases and in arsenals of the Ministry of Defense. This colossal amount of old junk has to be destroyed. But this occurs without any kind of hullabaloo—it is an operational process, nothing more. Chemical weapons should also be subjected to the same kind of destruction. Thus, why make a "worldwide show" of this? Perhaps behind the "smoke screen" of appeals and promises to avoid the fact that the weapons were to have been destroyed anyway, and it would be easier to conceal the true intentions? To get rid of the old junk and arm oneself with new toxic chemical agents that were not taken into account in convention documents, and so it is as if they were not even banned?

V. MIRZAYANOV:

"Our military generals have been ready for a chemical war under conditions of an international ban for a long time. They have conducted training at bases and in institutes and plants in the event of a surprise visit by international monitors. They have prepared the organization of the kind of industry in which material was always in operation that could be easily transformed into highly toxic chemical agents. You will agree: If we are developing, producing, and testing new types of chemical agents, but we are not

including them in the list subject to international monitoring, then this is by no means being done from good motives. Rather, this is an attempt to get around the convention, which unquestionably contradicts the interests of both Russia and its citizens. After all, it is assumed at the same time that the other participants in the convention will behave in a similar way."

Thousands of people, including people of very high rank in military uniform, have been put to work on the creation, testing, and production of chemical weapons. Is it easy to renounce that which has fed you all your life?

Our country, which has accumulated thousands and thousands of tonnes of toxic chemical agents, did not employ them even during the Great Patriotic War. But these tonnes have already killed more than one life (not enemies—but our own people), they have undermined the health of many workers engaged in the production of poisons, they have contaminated the area around the plants, and they have permanently destroyed the ecology. But is it not simpler generally to abandon chemical weapons, even those that are super-modern and not yet taken into account in the last convention?

V. Mirzayanov was arrested. The trial continues. The decision will become a litmus paper that will reveal once and for all how serious the intentions of the Russian military are in renouncing chemical weapons.

Incidentally, the possibility of arrest now hangs over still another chemist—V. Ulev. He is also accused of divulging a "state secret." Ulev himself says: "There was nothing secret in the article by Mirzayanov and Fedorov, neither chemical formulae nor any kind of specific substances that were part of the weapon were indicated. However, if the authorities do not take these facts into account, then after the next session of the court (scheduled for 3 February), I will be forced to name some formulae..."

Constitutionality of Mirzayanov Case Denied

944WC0027B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 1B

[Article by Andrey Vaganov: "Trial of Chemical Scientist Resumed: Solidarity of Colleagues and Public Support Needed"]

[Text]

The Trial

The hearing of the case charging Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian chemical scientist, with divulging a state secret is supposed to resume today at the Moscow city court. He is charged with publishing an article in coauthorship with another chemist, Lev Fedorov, in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, in which he made public facts concerning a new type of chemical weapon—a binary weapon.

In accordance with the new Russian Constitution (Article 15, Paragraph 3), the list of reports containing a state secret is defined by federal law. Up to the present time, such a publication of the federal law does not exist. It is for this reason that on 24 January 1994 Vil Mirzayanov refused to appear in court voluntarily, justifying this refusal by a reluctance to participate in an anticonstitutional trial.

On the eve of the resumption of the court examination, a whole number of public and political organizations came out with statements in support of Mirzayanov. Thus, the executive committee of the Russia's Choice electoral association and a faction of the same name in the State Duma of the Russian Federation in a statement expressed the hope that the Moscow city court will in a very short time complete the examination of the Mirzayanov case and pronounce a verdict of not guilty.

Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of the subcommittee for science of the Committee for Education, Culture, and Science of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, believes that the trial of the chemical scientist is an attempt to return to those times when a state of fear and terror reigned in society. In his words, the situation regarding the arrest of Vil Mirzayanov reminds him of 1970, when the geneticist scientist Zhores Medvedev was put into a psychiatric hospital in Kaluga for his book about Lysenko.

"Chemical and ecological scientists should play a big role in the current situation," thinks Nikolay Vorontsov. "If necessary, on their part it should come to rather tough sanctions with respect to the authoritative structures."

However, Mirzayanov's colleagues at present prefer not to actively advertise their attitude toward the court trial. Although, in the words of Nikolay Vorontsov, the president of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuriy Osipov expressed his personal point of view and condemned Mirzayanov's prosecution.

"If the chemical scientists do not come out in defense of their colleague, I do not know whether they will be invited to international conferences," Mr. Vorontsov emphasized.

Interesting in this connection is the statement of Lev Fedorov that the case of his coauthor began to unravel after Doctor of Chemical Sciences Viktor Petrunin wrote a denunciation to State Security addressed to the chief of the Economic Security Administration.

But while the chemical scientists are thinking about what position to take in this situation, even more fundamental measures are being proposed. If things are called by their proper names, this is blackmail and threats to divulge state secrets. The example of Vladimir Ulev (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of 28 January 1994) proved to be infectious, as could be expected. The seed fell on fertile soil. Valeriya Novodvorskaya issued an ultimatum: If Vil Mirzayanov is not released by 10 February, she will

pass information to the West concerning three developments that constitute a state secret. It is well known that our country was one of the most closed. So that for more than 70 years quite enough secrets accumulated, and there are enough state secrets for everyone. But there always have been more than enough people in Russia who like to scratch their name in the annals of history with a little nail.

More on Uglev Threat To Reveal CW Formula

94WC0031A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 6, 9-15 Feb 94 (signed to press 8 Feb 94) p 1

[Article by Andrey Zhdankin under the rubric "Weapons": "The Formula for Binary Death: The Disclosure Has Been Rescheduled"]

[Text] In the last issue we reported that chemical scientist Vladimir Uglev, one of the developers of the state-of-the-art types of domestic chemical weapons, had appealed through the press (in essence, issued an ultimatum) to the president of Russia. The scientist promised to divulge on 4 February "the chemical formulae and names, precursors for their production, and mode of combat application" of our binary weapons unless he was received by the president personally so that he could familiarize him with an "independent point of view" on the destruction of chemical weapons.

The dissident from the military-chemical complex has not been received by the president, 4 February has come and gone, but the world did not shudder. All the secrets except those divulged earlier remained in the scientist's head.

V. Uglev gave several reasons for his "restraint." In the first place, "up above," he believes, there has been a shift in ideas about the real problems related to the destruction of chemical weapons. The president's assistant for national security, Yuriy Baturin, met with the scientist. He agreed with Uglev that there are problems, and the primary one is clarifying the real quantities of our stockpiles.

Additionally, understanding the full measure of his responsibility, the scientist did not intend to reveal the secret. One of the distinctions of binary weapons from previous toxic substances is that the components in and of themselves present no great danger and are produced in immense quantities for peacetime purposes, and therefore it is practically impossible to stop up leaks. If they know the formula, in Uglev's words, fifth-grade chemistry students can manufacture a binary weapon that surpasses everything created heretofore in terms of its killing force. That is, the danger of uncontrolled spread of binary death is immense. As a person with common sense, the scientist did not intend to contribute to this, and his threat was a bluff, a means of making his way into the highest corridors of power.

The third factor is specific. Having loudly declared his intentions, V. Uglev expected authorized organs to pay

attention to him. But the special services ignored him. Uglev also knows the formulae for the latest developments in American chemical weaponry, which, incidentally, do not come under the Convention on Bans. It is logical to assume that our former potential enemies have a concrete idea of our "achievements." So the state secret has already leaked out, and all Uglev has to do is divulge the formula in order for all the former imperfections of the special services to be blamed on him.

Another reason disappeared of its own accord. Uglev demanded the release of V. Mirzayanov from "Sailor's Rest" prison. In the words of lawyer A. Asnis, Mirzayanov does not intend to change his decisions and therefore he will not submit petitions to change the punishment.

But V. Uglev is certainly not in a good mood. He does not rule out the possibility of divulging information about our achievements. "That moment may come if we are driven into a corner and the leaders continue to completely ignore these problems."

The problems are indeed of an apocalyptic nature. The official, fairly rosy position will not stand up under criticism. Generals of the military-chemical complex assert that destroying chemical weapons is dangerous, but in Volskiy Rayon, where the military chemical testing ground is located, the incidence of oncological diseases has almost doubled in two years. The average indicator for Russia is less than this by a factor of 2.5. These figures are from the Saratov Oncological Center. Surpluses concealed from the world community and the people themselves are being destroyed hastily and barbarically. Last summer an outbreak of skin diseases was reported in that same Volskiy Rayon. The clinical picture is the same as with mustard gas or lewisite contamination. The military blame the grass cow parsnip which, according to biologists, is found extremely rarely in those regions. An examination of the soil in certain places on the test ground showed the arsenic content to be 330 grams per kilogram of soil. Mustard gas and lewisite contain arsenic. The poison is simply poured onto the soil! One could give a long list of examples.

The program for the destruction of chemical weapons developed by generals from the military-chemical complex will apparently have to be revised. The contradictions between the majority of aspects of the official viewpoint and the positions of independent specialists, including V. Uglev, V. Mirzayanov, L. Fedorov, and others, may be what Lenin would have called blatant. This pertains both to the quantity and the classification and the technologies and the cost and the safety. Leaders of the military-chemical complex are remaining silent, but this cannot last long—these problems have received too great a response. It will be necessary to admit many unpleasant things. Having begun with some kind of "trivia," the official picture of military-chemical socialist realism is coming apart at the seams. So many sad sensations lie ahead.

IZVESTIYA Overview

94WC0033A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Feb 94 First Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA writer Valeriy Rudnev: "The Court Followed the State Security Path and Arrested the Scientist, But Refused To Pronounce a Sentence in the Vil Mirzayanov Case"]

[Text] Although the court's decision in the Vil Mirzayanov case was predictable, to be honest, it was unexpected. It was predictable because the ideology of "socialist legality" fully permitted such a concealed form of denial of justice. On the other hand, one does not want to believe that the court today can so blatantly and defiantly take advantage of these obsolete norms of criminal procedure. The more so with a case that is being followed throughout the world.

Understandably, a supplementary investigation is to the advantage of the procuracy and the investigation team in order to cover their tracks. But why would the court play into their hands?

IZVESTIYA has been writing about the V. Mirzayanov case since the criminal proceedings were initiated. We have discussed various angles of this story, which is incredible from the standpoint of common sense, and tried to understand the underlying causes of these repressive measures that have been taken against the scientist. We have tried to understand the logic of a state which, on the one hand, votes for an international Convention on Chemical Disarmament and, on the other, jails a person who has spoken out against Russia's "military-chemical" weapons. We have appealed to the reason of the investigators and procurators, proving that the scientist's action, regardless of how it may have displeased the bureaucrats, was for the good of public interests and not to their detriment. Alas, they would not listen to us.

But still there was hope in the court, a power that is independent of other state institutions, that is capable of listening to both sides and necessarily expressing an independent viewpoint regarding the conflict between the bureaucrats from the military-chemical complex and the citizen. Let me emphasize: The court does not have the right to refuse to hand down a verdict. It must say quite specifically whether the person is guilty or not. That is the point of the judicial practice.

According to the rules of criminal law in effect, the arguments of the investigators were quite adequate to put Mirzayanov behind bars. Were it not for one circumstance or, more precisely, constitutional condition: Any normative legal documents affecting the rights, freedoms, and obligations of a human being and a citizen may not be applied unless they are officially published for universal knowledge of them.

The lists of state secrets have the stamp "secret" and are not published anywhere. In other words, from the standpoint of human rights and the Constitution, it is as

though the lists do not exist. And it is impossible to bring criminal charges against a person on these grounds.

Did the investigators from state security and the procurators supervising them know this? They knew, of course, but instead of human rights and the Constitution they chose a different point of reference—criminal law of the 1961 model which is in force, alas, to this day and allows references to unpublished normative acts.

Alas, the court also followed in the footsteps of state security and the General Procuracy. And V. Mirzayanov, who was trying to protest, they brought up short using a well-known investigatory device—they put him under guard. That is how the judicial investigation began. And the judicial proceedings rolled on along the trail that had already been blazed by the investigation—the person with more rights is right.

In the investigators' version the chemist told the world something that he was categorically forbidden to divulge. It was forbidden, naturally, by the Lists. One small thing was lacking: Take the Lists in hand, put V. Mirzayanov's article in front of them, compare the texts, and draw a conclusion—did the scientist really divulge a state secret? Did he say what the Lists had forbidden him to divulge? The entire investigation would take a half hour! Then they could to present the Lists and their conclusions to the accused and his lawyer—go ahead and refute them, defend yourself.

But no: The investigation took more than a year and was actually reduced to a matter making it as difficult as possible for the accused to exercise his right to a defense. This was done in a brilliantly simple way—instead of the content of the List itself, the contradictory opinion of experts regarding points of the secret document was presented.

What was the court supposed to do in this case? In the first place, as the defense anticipated, examine the text of the List itself and understand the nature of the disagreements among the experts. In the second place, if the help of specialists was needed, schedule a new expert appraisal but with different experts. The court did nothing of the kind. It followed the same path as the investigators—it refused to include the List in the criminal case and it entrusted the repeat of the expert appraisal to the previous specialists.

The result was familiar—the experts again expressed disagreements. And the main document on which the accusation was based remained outside the investigation. Now there is already a judicial investigation. The circle has closed: The person with the greatest rights is right.

Why did the investigation team and the court so stubbornly conceal the List from the accused and his defense?

"I think there was just one reason," answered V. Mirzayanov's defense lawyer, Aleksandr Asnis. "The paragraphs of that document were not convincing enough to be indisputable evidence. Moreover, if the List were published today, V. Mirzayanov's innocence would be obvious to everyone. No expert opinion would be necessary."

It is known that the procurator is not overly delighted with the preliminary and the judicial investigations. Apparently he did not manage to obtain convincing evidence of V. Mirzayanov's guilt. If he is not proven guilty, is he then innocent? And will the procurator give an acquittal? Not at all. He used a tested weapon of "socialist legality"—he asked the court not to pronounce a verdict, actually to deny the accused justice, and to return the case for additional investigation.

It is not difficult to guess the results of the supplementary investigation. Such cases as V. Mirzayanov's do not go to court a second time—they are "buried" in the procuracy forever. And regardless of the procuracy's justification for closing the case—whether it be because the accusation was not proved or because the situation changed—the decision cannot be called just. For if there is no judicial decision, there is no justice. And that is the most terrible outcome of V. Mirzayanov's case—to be left with the investigatory brand for his entire life.

Incidentally, V. Mirzayanov himself agreed with the suggestion of the state plaintiff and did not object to having the case sent back for further investigation. The lawyer A. Asnis backed his client up. Why?

"We had no other choice," explains the lawyer. "We chose the lesser of two evils. There is no point in referring to the law in a society where legal principles and constitutional norms are not enforced. Even if the procuracy has real power over the court, obviously, it too has to decide. After this trial, neither Mirzayanov nor I had any hope left of obtaining justice."

I do not know the arguments the court used to justify its decision; journalists were not informed of that. But of one thing I am sure—the judicial investigation conducted following the model and likeness of the state security investigation did not add to its glory and did not lead to the truth. And I am afraid that the judges in these scandalous proceedings were quite suited to the typical position of bureaucrats of some "legal protection department" who actually act and make decisions in deference to their more influential colleagues—the procurators and investigators.

So for now let us not foster any hopes in that beautiful slogan about the separation of powers. Judging from the case of Vil Mirzayanov, it seems that we have only one power—military-chemical.

Scientist Mirzoyanov Released From Jail

LD2202184794 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1656 GMT 22 Feb 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Sergey Oleinik]

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Scientist Vil Mirzayanov, who is accused of disclosing a state secret about chemical weapons production in Russia, is to be released from jail on order of Prosecutor General Alexey Kazannik. However, he would be obliged to stay in Moscow, the prosecutor's office said on Tuesday.

Another Scientist Makes Threats

PM2302143194 Moscow *TRUD in Russian*
23 Feb 94 p 1

[Report by Igor Tsarev: 'State Secrets for the Masses!']

[Text] The case of chemist Mirzayanov accused of divulging state secrets concerning the development of chemical weapons is taking a new turn. In particular Valeriya Novodvorskaya has issued the following statement to the *POSTFACTUM* agency: "Inasmuch as the Russian president has found the time to express his distress over the tribulations of our hockey team at the Olympics and even telephoned personally to Norway while being unable to find either the time or the inclination to give an opinion on Vil Mirzayanov's imprisonment, on 21 February I sent two Western powers three secret studies of a strategic nature. That is I have done something which comes under article 65 of the Russian Federation criminal code—'espionage.'"

In addition V. Novodvorskaya said that unless Vil Mirzayanov is released by 10 March she will hand over the formula for a Russian binary weapon (over which all the trouble started) to a European Community state. Let us note that the chemist V. Uglev also intended to make this secret public.

Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik yesterday repealed the preventive restriction measure chosen by the course for detaining Vil Mirzayanov. Now he must be released immediately on the undertaking that he does not change his address.

Distortions of Position on CW Production, Destruction Hit

PM2802172594 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian* 26 Feb 94 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of Russian Armed Forces General Staff, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov: Russia Does Not Produce Chemical Weapons"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Articles and speeches by private individuals are continuing to appear in the press and on television in

which attempts are made to bring to the notice of Russia's population and the world public distorted information about Russia's compliance with the demands of international agreements in the sphere of banning chemical weapons and about the Defense Ministry's activity relating to questions of preparations to destroy these weapons.

At the editorial office's request the chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff dots the "i's" in this matter.

Kolesnikov: Production of chemical weapons in the former USSR was stopped in 1987 and has never been resumed, and their stocks have not been replenished or renewed. The stocks of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation Armed Forces do not exceed 40,000 tonnes by weight of toxins and are located on the Russian Federation's territory in seven specially equipped arsenals which make it possible to ensure their safe and reliable storage.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Is it proposed to destroy the existing stocks?

Kolesnikov: In accordance with a decision of the Russian Government, the Ministry of Defense is currently preparing the necessary grounds for a Russian chemical weapons destruction program. The Defense Ministry is also the state customer for work on creating ecologically safe technologies for destroying (recycling) chemical weapons. At the same time it uses in its work the principles of glasnost in choosing the necessary technologies and discusses together with the regions' representatives the sections of the draft program, the project documentation, and other substantiating documents which concern them. It actively promotes coverage in the mass media and in scientific publications of various aspects of the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons. The time for adopting "quiet" decisions is long gone.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: How is it proposed to implement this program which, without exaggeration, is unprecedented? Will the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons not affect people's health and the ecology?

Kolesnikov: The destruction of chemical weapons will be carried out in the Russian Federation only at installations specially created for these purposes, and their location will be decided by a government commission. It has been formed in accordance with the Russian president's directive of 9 August 1993. The basic condition in preparing for destruction is to ensure the safety of the population and the environment. To these ends the Defense Ministry cooperates closely with oblast and republic inspection organs in monitoring the population's health and taking samples of objects in the environment. Such work has already been carried out in the region of Kambarka city in the Udmurt Republic and in Saratov Oblast's Krasnopartizanskiy Rayon (Gornyy settlement) and Volskiy Rayon (Shikany settlement). Top-class medical specialists, professionals in their own line,

are involved in carrying it out. The results of the assessment of the state of health are reported to the regions where this work is carried out.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Everything is clear, you might think. The Defense Ministry makes no secret of the large-scale measure that is being prepared and is ready to pass information to the interested persons. Nevertheless, fabricated articles which inflame the atmosphere in society are continuing to appear. How do you rate them?

Kolesnikov: In this connection the Defense Ministry deems it necessary to declare that the use of information relating to military-chemical potential and to the Russian Federation's fulfillment of its pledges under international treaties in the sphere of banning chemical weapons must be based exclusively on official sources. The opinions of private individuals may not serve as a basis for assessing Russia's activity in the said sphere. The incompetence and unreliability of the sources of information are inflaming the situation in places where stocks of chemical weapons are stored and where the military units dealing with the problem of destroying chemical weapons are stationed, and they are helping to shape a distorted and false public understanding of the real state of affairs in respect of Russia's desire to eliminate chemical weapons stocks. All this can be regarded as blackmail for the purpose of vilifying Russia's methods of preparing to destroy chemical weapons and damaging our country's political authority.

For everyone who makes such statements and for those who disseminate them among the public it is time to ponder the question: Whom does this benefit?

Local CW Issues

PM2402161594 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2020 GMT 18 Feb 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Saratov Oblast by I. Deryugin and Ye. Gerasimenko, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [202502] Echoes of the press scandal and legal proceedings concerning chemical weapons which have taken place in the capital can be heard also in our region, especially since one of this sector's main facilities is located right here. I am referring to Shikhany. The veil of secrecy shrouding the local military test range and two institutes involved in the development of chemical weapons in the past has been slightly lifted.

However, this does not mean that fewer questions are now being asked among either the local population or the military themselves as regards the range of problems concerning chemical weapons. Reports about alleged flareups of skin diseases and other allergies, attributed to the proximity of the dangerous chemical facility, which periodically appear in the local press are rebutted by the military. However, an independent expert medical and ecological study is constantly being put off. And where

should the money for such a study come from when there are no funds even for maintaining the GITOS [as heard, expansion unknown], the Shikhany institute which used to develop chemical weapons in the past and has been devising techniques for their destruction in recent years. As from the beginning of February the institute staff have been sent on indefinite, unpaid vacation.

The absence of a clear state program for the destruction of chemical weapons and the uncertainty about the Shikhany facilities' participation in this process cannot but spawn new rumors and add tension to the situation. [202614] [video shows extensive views of interior, exterior of Shikhany facilities]

CW Destruction Plant Behind Schedule

PM1802113994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Chemical Weapons Threaten Volga Region. Deadline for Their Destruction May Not Be Met"]

[Text] Saratov Oblast—Around now a terminal was to have been built on the banks of the Volga in Saratov Oblast to strip out [peretarivaniye] chemical agents from their containers [yemkosti] and subsequently detoxify them. That at least is what the draft first stage of the state program for the destruction of chemical weapons envisages. However, local residents, worried by leaks at stores that have been here a long time, have sounded the alarm and are objecting to new installations with this kind of specialism.

Russia's president signed the Paris Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons a year ago, in January 1993. According to the Convention, the first installation for the destruction of chemical agents must be tested within two years at most. Half this time has already elapsed and Russia still has no laws, no concept, no approved state program for chemical weapons destruction. Meanwhile leaks of poisonous substances from containers that have eroded have been recorded at the arsenal sited on the territory of Saratov Oblast.

The village of Gornyy, where 690 tonnes of mustard gas, 225 tonnes of lewisite, and 210 tonnes of their compounds are stored, is not far from the Volga. The chemical weapons that have been here for ages, packed in metal barrels and railroad tankers, pose a potential danger.

The strength of the harmful chemicals will be reduced by a factor of 1,000-10,000 when the chemical agents are stripped out at the new terminal. The plan is to reprocess the reactive matter obtained in Shikhany, 100 km from Gornyy, where the top-secret State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technology [SIOT], which developed chemical weapons in the recent past, is located.

Doctor of Sciences Aleksandr Kochergin, the institute's director, said that several technologies have been developed for the destruction of the stocks from the arsenal in Gornyy. Whereas the situation is clear with regard to the mustard gas, a choice has not yet been made with regard to the lewisite and its compounds. In the opinion of SIOT scientists, the most preferable option is for this kind of chemical agent to be recycled [utilizatsiya] since it contains costly arsenic used in microelectronics, laser technology, optics, and pharmaceuticals. In other words, the recycling technology presupposes not only expenditure on chemical weapons destruction but also considerable income from the reprocessing of chemical agents into particularly pure arsenic, which Russia does not currently produce.

This technology can also be used to recycle arsenic-containing adamsite—an irritant chemical agent produced early this century, which has been shipped to Shikhany from throughout the former Union—of which more than 8,000 tonnes have been buried straight in the ground at the testing range of the military institute next to SIOT. The huge Russian adamsite dump is a source of great worry not only to the public but also to scientists, who are voicing misgivings over the possible environmental contamination from these stocks.

It may seem to the uninitiated that there are no particular problems with the destruction of the Saratov arsenal. It is only the choice of technology and the construction of a terminal and recycling installations that are holding things up. However, one must not forget that we are talking about chemical weapons, which are to be destroyed in densely populated areas right next to the Volga. This is a very sensitive subject for the residents of the area since the environmental background here is unfavorable enough as it is. In the city of Volsk, for instance, which is no more than 5 km from Shikhany as the crow flies, the arsenic content in the soil is already several times in excess of the maximum permissible concentrations owing to three local cement plants using so-called pyrite cinders, which contain arsenic, in their manufacturing process. People's disquiet is intensified by the constant rumors about the danger of radiological contamination of the area from the Balakovo nuclear electric power station 50 km from Volsk. Add to that atmospheric discharges by Balakovo's big chemical giants and you will understand the public concern, which is threatening to develop into an organized protest against the siting of chemical weapons destruction facilities in these areas.

This disquiet is intensified by conjecture and speculation due to the utter secrecy surrounding the facilities at Shikhany. I visited them, spoke with scientists, and saw that there is no intention of building any more production units here, the former technology used for the synthesis of chemical agents has merely been reversed. According to the findings of a special environmental and medical monitoring laboratory, the air in Shikhany is considerably cleaner than in Volsk, people live longer and have fewer illnesses.

Choosing the technology is only part of the problem and by no means the most important part. Social and environmental questions are the main thing. Mikhail Yakovlev, Saratov Oblast Administration department head, briefed me on a Russian Government draft decree that the residents of the oblast have prepared on their own initiative. It enshrines their immediate demands without whose fulfillment the chemical weapons destruction process cannot be started. During the first quarter of this year the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian President and the Ministry of Defense, in conjunction with other departments, are asked to define a concept, prepare drafts of a basic law and a number of other legislative acts designed to form the legal base for the practical implementation of the Paris Convention, and guarantee safety, health, and social protection. According to civilized norms, the facilities for the storage and destruction of chemical weapons and the population centers around them should be given special status with all the concomitant guarantees, as is the case in the United States for instance.

The demand for regular environmental and medical monitoring is also natural. During the first stage, before the experimental installations begin work, the intention is to study the state of the environment and carry out a comprehensive screening process involving residents in Volskiy and Krasnopartizanskiy Rayons, which include Shikhany and Gornyy, in order to determine the consequences of the storage and testing of chemical weapons on the environment and the population's health.

The importance of the social and environmental aspects can be judged from the funding structure, where expenditure on monitoring and the social everyday sphere in Shikhany, Volsk, and Gornyy amounts to 67 billion rubles [R] of the R72 billion that the oblast administration deems it necessary to allocate for the entire first phase of the program, a phase culminating in the construction and testing of the experimental-industrial facility for the destruction and recycling of chemical agents and the creation of the requisite support infrastructure.

Nadezhda Saratovtseva, head of administration of the settlement of Shikhany, has a better knowledge of the whole set of problems than anyone else. She takes part without fail in all the meetings and talks on this topic and has even addressed parliamentary hearings.

"The state program for the destruction of chemical weapons has been in the process of being written and draft laws have been in the process of being harmonized since 1989," she said. "Presidents, governments, and parliaments have come and gone, but still there are no laws and no program. There is no concept and no funding. The SIOST has not been paid for three months and that unique institution is on the verge of stoppages. The social sphere—the burden of which is borne entirely by the institute—is going to pieces."

Judging by the center's unhurried approach, one can confidently assume today that the schedule proposed by the Saratov administration in its draft government decree will also be disrupted.

"You produced the chemical weapons, you destroy them," Saratovtseva was told by one highly-placed Moscow official.

Meanwhile the chemical bomb planted almost on the very banks of the Volga may spring its surprise at any minute. In that case it would not only be the residents of Saratov on the Volga who would suffer.

Krasnoyarsk Workers Angry Over Unpaid Wages

*PM1502154994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Feb 94 First Edition p 1*

[Aleksey Tarasov report: "Siberian Military Plants on the Brink of Upheavals. There Is No Money and No Work"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—The situation in the military-industrial complex' Siberian domains is becoming explosive: The many-thousands-strong collective of one of the biggest production facilities in the Russian defense industry—the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant, a state enterprise upon which an order has been conferred—is in a state of turmoil. The missile builders are taking a tough stand and demanding money and work.

On the last working day of last week around 500 people "besieged" the plant's management, and by evening practically the entire shift at the Krasnoyarsk Machine-building Plant was participating in an emergency meeting. General Director V. Gupalov was taken to hospital for intensive care, suffering from an attack of angina pectoris. The disturbances spilled over from the territory of the secret plant onto the streets; workers went off to see the governor in search of the truth, threatening to blockade the kray administration building and seal off the roads if he did not help immediately.

There was another meeting on Monday where, as the "Krasmach" directors informed IZVESTIYA, the collective by and large agreed with the proposals made by the plant's leadership for stabilizing the situation. Gupalov flew to Moscow. It has been said that the government has allocated money. But this money has not appeared yet. So a new outburst of passions may occur at any moment.

"Krasmach's" customer—the Ministry of Defense—has failed to pay the missile manufacturers 11.3 billion rubles [R] for the state order carried out last year. Wages have not been paid for four months, and there is no money for the absolute essentials.

Technical Director L. Kovrigin told IZVESTIYA that the plant leadership has appealed to the president, the premier, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. At the end of December V. Chernomyrdin gave instructions for the debts to be paid off during January.

Security Council Secretary O. Lobov reported that the president wrote the following resolution on the appeal from the missile manufacturers: For immediate and strict implementation. Nevertheless, the plant has not received the money.

The director's order on the closure of the assembly shops as of 15 February for six weeks—as it stands at the moment—has added fuel to the flames. Those who have not taken enforced leave will work three days a week (until now the plant has had a four-day week). The point is that in recent years, the Ministry of Finance has not only not been in a hurry to settle its accounts, but even to conclude contracts with the plant. Under the law on the state order, "Kras mash" should obtain a contract two years before the manufacturing deadline, since the cycle of manufacture of the articles takes up more than one year. The plant was meant to have been given an advance by 1 February for the purchase of vital materials. The contract has still not been signed and the money has not been transferred. This practice has become the norm. Others would doubtless interpret it as the fact that their services are no longer needed. But "Kras mash" has continued to selflessly forge the motherland's missile shield. The conversion of the leading brains in the military-industrial complex is a very difficult matter. Judging by his behavior, which is not consonant with the economic situation, the general director is continuing to be more worried about the Russian defense capability than about the fate of the labor collective entrusted to him. The director has remained a general, but has not become an entrepreneur. Which may be pleasant to the state, but not to the workers, the reserves of whose selfless devotion have run dry.

At the moment it is the local authorities who are settling up for the debts to the military-industrial complex. Governor V. Zubov has allocated 1 billion to the machine builders. This will be enough to pay October's wages and part of November's. The missile builders have received assistance from the budget by dint of their strength, although the situation of other groups in the population is scarcely much better. Workers in high schools, colleges, and universities are in a state of combat readiness for mass protest actions. The list of enterprises in the kray which have come to a standstill or are working at half-strength is breath-taking. The ship-building plant has just stopped carrying out the military order, and its workers have been sent off on a three-week vacation. The trade union committee has of course put forward some demands... The professional guardians of the people are increasingly feeling that they are "in their element." The unforgettable appeal to the proletariat to unite is in use again. Communists are proposing to extend the spheres of influence of the strike committees, and the executive committee of the "Trudovoye Krasnoyarske" movement is appealing for the formation of a united city strike committee.

The revolt at "Kras mash" has been brewing for a long time and seems to be entirely natural. At one time the empire of the missile builders had been divided into six

plants, and in a single year of their free existence, matters took an upward turn for capable people. But in 1992, under pressure from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry, the State Committee for the Management of State Property scorned the laws, the opinion of the labor collectives, and economic expediency, and drove five plants into the stable of the military-industrial complex once again, thereby placing them under a single boss. Having glued together an unviable monster, the state has not nevertheless even determined whether it needs "the most important strategic output," on whose production "Kras mash" has the monopoly. No money is being found to pay for it. Well, if even the instructions of the president and the prime minister are not being carried out, should the basic production be carved up for scrap? After all, in principle it cannot respecialize. Or does Russia still need ballistic missiles for submarines and other complex military output? Why does the state allow chiefs of shops and workers and officials at local level to be tormented by these questions?

In the past we use to be called Upper Volta with missiles. I don't know about the Volta bit, although I suppose there is a similarity, but all the indications are that it may be tough as regards the missiles.

Strategic Bombers Have Left Kazakhstan for Russia

*LD2202204094 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1715 GMT 22 Feb 94*

[Text] Petr Deinekin, Commander of the Russian Air Force, told Interfax Tuesday that all aircraft of the strategic nuclear force had been moved from Kazakhstan to Russia.

In his words, the last four Tu-95 MS of the 79th heavy bomber division, stationed near Semipalatinsk, had been withdrawn from Kazakhstan to Russia on his orders on February 19.

He said that a total of 40 Tu-95 MS's had once been stationed in Kazakhstan. They have been moved into Russia which is the successor of the Soviet Union as far as nuclear forces are concerned. "The withdrawal of heavy bombers, as they are referred to in the treaty even though they are strategic rocket carrying aircraft, from Kazakhstan into Russia was consistent with START I because this was done within the former Soviet Union," Deinekin said.

Several obsolete Tu-95 bombers that still stay in Semipalatinsk airfield were manufactured in 1955 and pose no threat because Kazakhstan does not possess rockets of nuclear warheads for this type of bombers, he said.

He made it clear that Kazakhstan lacked the capability to assure safe storage of nuclear warheads or to keep strategic aircraft operational. "As a professional I am confident that outside Russia none of the CIS member nations can keep the air force component of the strategic nuclear forces operational because this requires large

spending, very high skills and aid from design boards and manufacturing industries," he explained.

Of all these countries only Ukraine possesses strategically important aircraft. In particular, there are 20 Tu-95 bombers in Uzin, 50 km away from Kiev, and 20 Tu-160 aircraft in Priluki, Chernigov Region, Deinekin said. He added that only a few of them were capable of taking off.

Deinekin said that talks were underway with the Ukrainian armed forces on withdrawal of these aircraft into Russia "but we have not come to a full understanding."

General Says No Control Over Ukraine, Kazakhstan Nuclear Arms

LD2202212194 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1715 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Commander of the Russian long-range nuclear weapons Gen. Igor Sergeyev says Moscow is no longer in control of the safety of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine.

In an interview with Interfax on Tuesday, he said that the missile troops deployed in Ukraine were no longer under Moscow's control after the commanders of the 43rd and 46th missile divisions took an oath of allegiance to Kiev.

Sergeyev spoke of being unable to control troops "whose officers expressed loyalty to another state." He said he outlined the emerging situation in letters to Ukrainian and Russian Defence Ministers Vitaliy Radetskyy and Pavel Grachev.

At the same time, the Russian official pointed to progress in the negotiations on the pullout of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. He said the first batch of nuclear weapons was to be transferred to Russia on March 28.

Sergeyev said that tension was also running high over the nuclear weapons deployed in Kazakhstan whose leadership prevented the transfer of weapons to Russia and opposed the plan for taking obsolete missiles off combat duty. Sergeyev says the dismantling of those missiles should have been started in 1993 but nothing has so far happened.

In his words, Moscow has no problems with the servicing or withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. "These have remained under our jurisdiction," said the general. He also said that one of the three missile divisions deployed in Belarus had been pulled out and disbanded as scheduled.

The two remaining divisions are to be withdrawn and demobilized in the first half of 1996. Sergeyev says the withdrawal process will taken in stages: four regiments will be withdrawn in 1994 and the other four a year later. This will bring an end to the pullout of nuclear weapons from Belarus. The two divisions are to be disbanded in the first half of 1996.

Sergeyev says that his troops' combat readiness is just as high as in the period of stagnation in the former Soviet Union when military supplies were good. In his words, the withdrawal of obsolete missiles were being carried out as scheduled.

Role of Military in Space Program Viewed

LD2702232594 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Report by Aleksandr Galkin; from the "Voskresenye" newscast]

[Text] The Baykonur cosmodrome. It was the place where the history of Russia's military space forces started in 1955, though they developed into an independent structure much later, at the beginning of the 1980's. The jurisdiction of the military space forces, if one can call it that, covers the cosmodromes of Baykonur, in Kazakhstan, and Plesetsk, which is in the Arkhangelsk oblast, as well as the main center of the control and telemetry complex in Golitsino in the Moscow countryside, and the tracking stations situated across the country from the western borders to Kamchatka.

[Begin recording] Valeriy Grin, chief of the headquarters of the main center of the control and telemetry complex: It is our duty to ensure that our military and political leadership is warned of the preparation for a possible aggression or war by—well, it is not the fashion now to call them a probable enemy, but that does not matter, it is our duty to do this.

Galkin: Well, the spy satellites, are they your business?

Grin: It is the the state's duty to ensure its security, including by means of intelligence work in all spheres, both on the ground and in the air, and in space as well.

Galkin: So you manage these spheres [words indistinct] as well?

Grin: Like any other power. Look at the United States, and certainly China.

Galkin: One can speak about this openly now. All the space launches, from the first sputnik to the international teams, were done by the military. I remember with shame how we made the officers and soldiers change their clothes because of the censorship. How whole episodes were cut out of programs if a service cap was glimpsed in the background. And that was at a time when all the world knew that the military were participating in the Soviet space programs. Today the military space forces have dropped the masquerade, thank God. But by no means does this mean that there are no longer any real secrets here. Of course there are, and as usual they are being well guarded.

The highest qualifications are needed to manage space. One cannot achieve them in one or two years. That is one of the main problems of the military space forces today. According to the present rules officers are transferred to

the reserve the same as in line units, at the age of 45-50. But a mathematician, a ballistics expert, or a programmer is at the height of his professional skill at that age. How can this unique system, which so far acknowledges no state borders and is resistant to any hindrance except a political one, be preserved? The staff problems are, of course, a difficult thing, but they can, one hopes, can be surmounted. The cutting of funding for space programs, however, is already being felt in carrying out economic and military tasks. Unfortunately, our history is full of cases where small economies led us to lose on important things later. Space systems should not become hostage to the ruble and society's disdainful attitude to them.

Galkin: Which arms of service will be the first to disappear in the future and which ones will remain to the end, so to speak?

Grin: Well, I find it difficult to say which ones will disappear first, but I know that military space forces will remain to the end. [end recording]

Galkin: Yes, times have changed. We have stopped viewing the world through a vision slit. We are viewed now without the previous suspicion. But it is premature and even dangerous to say that there is no need for the army. [Video shows view of Baykonur, scenes of servicemen working with electronic equipment in the control center, Grin talking to the correspondent in room, launching pads, rockets being launched, radars, satellites in orbit, a military parade]

BELARUS

Group Urges To Assist FRY, Reconsider Nuclear Status, NPT

WS2402151394 Minsk DOBRY VECHAR
in *Belarusian* 22 Feb 94 p 1

[Report by Yuryy Alyakseyew: "There Should Be Peace in the World"]

[Text] The Belarusian Committee for Solidarity With Serbs and Montenegrins [BKSSCh] has sent a letter to Supreme Soviet Chairman Mechyslaw Hryb and Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, in which it appeals to "defend our Serbian brothers." "At the time when the Slavic civilization is on the verge of physical termination," says the letter, "we propose to take the following steps: To establish diplomatic relations with the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]; to temporarily provide complex assistance for the FRY; to denounce any sanctions against our brothers; to reexamine the issue of Belarus' nonnuclear status as contradictory to national security of the entire Slavic world; and to secede from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The BKSSCh has also issued a statement supporting the position of the Belarusian Prime Minister V. Kebich that

indicates that "air raids in Yugoslavia can divide not only Europe but also the entire world." "Therefore," the statements notes, "the problems in Yugoslavia should be resolved by peaceful means."

Prime Minister on CFE Commitments

LD1302144094 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1321 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Speaking about cuts in the Belarusian offensive weapons, [Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav] Kebich said that if Belarus was not given financial assistance in disarmament, it would not be able to eliminate tanks and aircraft at the old rate according to international agreements. He said that Belarus bore all of the related expenses on its own.

The economic problems complicate the financing of the disarmament program, said Kebich. He also pointed out that Belarus was honestly and consistently implementing its commitments to cut down armaments and would continue to do so in the future.

KAZAKHSTAN

Baykonur's On-Again, Off-Again Lease

LD2302210894 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1721 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] There can be no leasing agreement on the Baykonur cosmodrome with Russia unless the status of Russian troops servicing the facility has been resolved, Deputy General Director of Kazakhstan's Aerospace Agency Aisultan Kalybayev told Interfax on Wednesday.

He quoted Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev as saying there can be no question of "military bases" on the country's soil.

Talks on Baykonur To Continue in March

LD2302201494 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1406 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] Russia and Kazakhstan intend to continue bilateral talks on a military cooperation and use of Baykonur space launching station treaty.

A high ranking official of the Russian Space Agency (RSA) told Interfax that "members of the Russian state commission under RSA Director General Yuriy Koptev must leave for Almaty on March 1." He emphasized that "the drafts that were submitted by the Russian negotiators in Moscow at the end of January have been agreed on, only minor points have to be clarified."

In his view, the Almaty meeting "is likely to finalize documents that will be signed by the presidents of the two countries in a near future."

Baykonur, the largest space launching station of the former USSR and the world, became Kazakhstan's property when the republic won independent in October 1991. All its launching pads are still manned by the Russian Space Force which, in the words of Koptev, "wants to continue operating Baykonur for at least 15 to 20 years more."

Experts say that most Russian space missions cannot be launched elsewhere. What is more, Russia has commitments to joint programs, in particular with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the U.S.A. it has signed a \$400 Mn contract on construction of an international orbital station and commercial launches of western satellites by Russian Proton boosters which can be launched only from Baykonur pads.

IZVESTIYA Charges Nuclear Accident Imminent

Paper Cites Morale, Cash Problems

PM1102172194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Feb 94 First Edition p 1

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Nuclear Magazines in Kazakhstan Are on the Verge of an Accident"]

[Text] While Kiev and Moscow are reaching agreement on the fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, a critical situation has taken shape in the nuclear magazines located on the territory of Kazakhstan. IZVESTIYA has been told this by informed sources at the Russian Ministry of Defense.

As is known, 104 SS-18 missiles—the heaviest in the world—each with 10 nuclear warheads, and also Tu-95MS strategic bombers with 240 cruise missiles with a nuclear payload are stationed in that state. The situation on the nuclear technical bases where these specialized munitions are stored is becoming threatening. Particularly in the garrisons at Derzhavinsk in Turgay Oblast and at Zhargiz-Tobe in Semipalatinsk Oblast, where two missile divisions are stationed.

The number of nuclear munitions laid in store [are] more than twice the permissible norms. The fire alarm system, the fire extinguishing equipment, and the electric wiring are literally on their last legs and virtually do not work. If, God forbid, some untoward situation were to arise, it would be problematic to get the nuclear warheads out of the building and also to extinguish the flames—the consequences do not bear thinking about. Things are no better in the shop in which operational checks on the reentry vehicles of strategic missiles are carried out. For several months now it has been in a precarious [avariynyy] state. The end wall has come away from the building, and if it collapses it will bury beneath itself both nuclear warheads and people.

I was told that there is no heating or water in the special premises of the missile technical bases. The technical contrivances for guarding these bases, the engineered

structures—or more accurately, the wire entanglements—and the protection device along which high-tension current passes have been disconnected from the power supply network, and the mine fields and signal rockets are not activated when the perimeters of the guarded sectors are violated by wild animals and people. The guard subunits are not fully manned, and their training is at such a low level that you can only be amazed that no one has yet stolen a single atom bomb. Maybe this is only because it is so cold now in the steppes of Northern Kazakhstan and criminals do not feel like going after nuclear secrets.

There is, in principle, just one reason for all these disgraceful things, which specialists call by the abstruse term "gross violation of the explosion-and-fire-safety requirements"—the lack of an interstate agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on the status of, and on the future fate of, the missile technical bases and the strategic missile troops stationed on the state's territory.

Although Almaty does not consider itself the owner of these specific weapons and has announced that the state has subscribed to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a country which does not possess them, according to information from the same source, its officials prohibit the Russian military from taking them outside the republic to manufacturing plants and, moreover, do not permit the delivery to the garrisons of the necessary spare parts and tools or the equipment for carrying out repair work or the warranty servicing of nuclear munitions.

The national bank of Kazakhstan does not have a ruble account to which Russia could transfer money to pay for the labor of its officers and ensigns or allocate funds for electricity or to ensure the garrisons' vital activity.

Owing to chronic nonpayments, the missilemen regularly have their electricity cut off, and this, so specialists say, could result in the unpredictable behavior of the entire nuclear missile complex.

"Things have reached the point," one of the officers who have arrived from Kazakhstan told me, "where our pay is smuggled over the border to us."

But there is nothing to buy in the garrison stores even with the money that the officers do get—they are completely empty. The mood among officers could not be worse. Virtually over half the nuclear specialists with top qualifications do not wish to sign contracts for military service here. Deserters have even appeared among officers, and 14 recent graduates of higher military schools went absent without leave from one of the divisions and have not turned up for service for several months now. Four of them are specialists on nuclear warheads.

According to the information which the editorial office has, repeated requests from the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense to Kazakhstani Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko to help to organize the normal

functioning of the nuclear missile installations located in the country have not produced any results. Written requests have not even been answered. Maybe the visit to Almaty of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev will get something moving. But the military is afraid that this process might drag on indefinitely. Nuclear weapons cannot wait endlessly.

Official Denies Story

*LD1402105694 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 0700 GMT 14 Feb 94*

[Excerpts] State adviser Tulegen Zhukeyev described as absolutely untrue to fact, the story: Nuclear magazines in Kazakhstan are on the brink of an accident, published by IZVESTIYA on 12 February. At a news conference it was said that: This publication is very likely to have been ordered and inspired by those who are interested in introducing additional complications into the negotiations that are likely to be started between the two states on the issues of nuclear weapons, and a search for mutually acceptable decisions on a parity basis, taking into account mutual benefits.

Zhukeyev voiced the opinion that the Russian military and industrial complex can be such a party, because it aims at enhancing its influence on the elaboration of the policy in the corridors of power of the Russian Federation and wants to take upon itself individual decision-making, though it has succeeded in this too much already. It practically has disavowed the agreement between the CIS nuclear states about mutual control over nuclear stocks, and the strategic designation troops are completely under the Russian military leadership's command. The state adviser said further: Probably, the fact that Kazakhstan has suspended the export of inter-continental ballistic missiles, which has been done entirely through Kazakhstan's own goodwill, is causing this displeasure among certain forces. [passage omitted]

Zhukeyev said: It makes us think that the Russian military and industrial complex is counting on the possibility that the world community would apply additional pressure on Kazakhstan in connection with the nuclear weapons problem. [passage omitted]

U.S. Inspectors: International Obligations Being Observed

*LD2502160994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1537 GMT 25 Feb 94*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Ivan Zakharchenko for TASS]

[Text] Almaty February 25 TASS—Kazakhstan fully observes its international obligations, U.S. military inspectors told a news conference here today after visiting the Petropavlovsk heavy machine-building plant. The plant used to produce launchers for medium- and shorter-range missiles.

The inspection was made within the framework of the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles joined by Kazakhstan after disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The republic has a quota on sending its inspectors to the United States and an obligation to admit U.S. representatives to Kazakh facilities liable for inspection.

The inspection was the first of the sort in sovereign Kazakhstan. It was held in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect thanks to the correct stand of the Kazakh Defence Ministry's accompanying team on treaty obligations, said the Americans.

The experts are sure Kazakhstan will continue to fully observe its military obligations.

UKRAINE

Official Denies Ukraine Impeding Russia in Servicing Nukes

*LD2402182794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1812 GMT 24 Feb 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—Ukraine has no possibility to fully service nuclear weapons, Col.-Gen. Ivan Bizhan, deputy defense minister of Ukraine, told ITAR-TASS today.

According to the Ukrainian commander who is participating in a two-day meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth countries in Moscow, "Russia has assumed an obligation to carry out a guarantee and author's supervision over nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, and all conditions are being created here for Russian specialists to service nuclear objects."

Commenting on the report by a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry on the impossibility to service nuclear objects on the Ukrainian territory, Ivan Bizhan noted that "there are separate structures in Ukraine which do not like the normal course of resolving Russo-Ukrainian problems concerning nuclear weapons." According to the Ukrainian general, "there was not a single case of banning or impeding the servicing of nuclear weapons."

The Ukrainian deputy defense minister expressed confidence that "in the near future Ukraine will resolve with Russia the problem of the strategic nuclear aircraft which remained on the Ukrainian territory." Bilateral talks are being held on this issue, the general pointed out.

Official Discusses NPT Accession With Swiss Ambassador

*LD2402185294 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian 1510 GMT
24 Feb 94*

[Text] Kiev, 24 February—Valentyn Lemish, chairman of the Commission for Defense and State Security Issues,

met Armin Kamer, Switzerland's ambassador to Ukraine. Mr. Kamer was particularly interested in the possibility of the present composition of parliament resolving the issue of Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Valentyn Lemish noted the advisability of submitting this issue to the Supreme Council for examination in March of this year. The commission chairman also emphasized that it was desirable that the United States of America and Russia take practical steps now in reply to the Supreme Council resolution withdrawing the reservations to Article 5 of the Protocol to the START Treaty.

Western Aid in Return for Scrapping Nukes Seen as Meager

WS2402200494 Kiev *VECHIRNIY KYIV*
in Ukrainian 23 Feb 94 p 1,2

[Article by Oksana Boyko: "A Jacket of Aid for Ukraine Made in the West. A Strait-Jacket?"]

[Text] The ambassadors of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Great Britain, and the United States met on 14 February with President Leonid Kravchuk to hand him a joint declaration by their governments that cordially welcomed decisions made by the Ukrainian Supreme Council regarding the tripartite Declaration signed in Moscow by the Ukrainian, American, and Russian presidents and the START I Treaty. The above states expressed their intention to closely cooperate with Ukraine and to assist in the dismantling of nuclear weapons, the conversion program, environmental protection, retraining and alternative employment for those engaged in manufacturing and servicing the nuclear weapons, etc. Bilateral economic cooperation was also promised.

However, no specific figures for the aid were given. As the diplomats explained at the press conference, specific projects are now in the works, though some governments have already devised their programs. The Japanese ambassador mentioned \$100 million that his country intends to give to Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan for disarmament, while the German charge d'affaires said his government earmarked 10 million Deutschmarks for Ukraine, which were not paid because of conditions for START I put forward by the Ukrainian legislature. We will soon learn how much Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko will "bring" back from Bonn, where he went on an official visit.

So, we will have a jacket of aid made by the whole world. A thin jacket. The same applies to the security guarantees—nothing specific was proposed here except for the bright prospects opened by the "Partnership for Peace" program, contacts with NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, etc. In general, however, all those solemn declarations are simply designed to give President Kravchuk moral support in his relations with the

parliament, because Ukraine is expected to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

But another press conference was held that same day, where they talked about projects for Ukraine estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars, and at their initial stage at that. The multinational ABB, whose president Percy Barnevik visited Ukraine on the invitation of Leonid Kravchuk, is one of the leading corporations in power engineering. It offered us projects directed at Ukraine's energy independence. They involve energy-saving technologies in chemical and petrochemical industries as well as modernization of our coal and atomic power stations, which for Percy Barnevik are the future of Ukrainian power engineering. They also provide for setting up a special international investment fund for atomic engineering and Ukrainian power engineering in general. ABB is planning soon to start up five or six joint ventures in Ukraine to implement its projects.

NPT Considers

Kravchuk Says New Parliament To Decide on Nuclear Treaty

LD1702102294 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English
0926 GMT 17 Feb 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo February 17 TASS—The present Ukrainian parliament will have no time to settle the question of Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, handing over this problem to the new legislature to be elected on March 27, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said in an interview with the Japanese *ASAHI* newspaper in Kiev on Thursday.

The president said, the newspaper notes, that he "favours stronger economic cooperation with Russia" but denies the existence of a territorial issue and that "the international community will not recognise" stronger political ties between the Crimea and Russia.

Kravchuk referred to the tripartite agreement on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, which was signed by him as well as by the Russian and U.S. presidents in Moscow. Under this agreement, Washington assumed the role of a guarantor of Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders.

Among outstanding issues between Ukraine and Russia, Kravchuk singled out a package of questions connected with the future of the Black Sea Fleet. For instance, he is worried over how and at what price to sell the Ukrainian part of the divided fleet to Russia.

The president also expressed hope for a success of his coming U.S. visit on March 4 and his meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton. According to Kravchuk, this visit

will "help change the position of the international community on Ukraine which will become a nuclear-free state."

The Ukrainian president expressed his expectations that the United States will fulfill its obligations to boost financial aid to Ukraine. "Its total sum will possibly amount to 600 or 700 million dollars," he said.

Kravchuk Submits Representation on Accession

LD2402213694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] According to information from the press service of Ukraine's president and Cabinet of Ministers, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has submitted an additional representation to Ukraine's Supreme Council with regard to our state's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. People's deputies are currently studying the representation.

Parliament Needs Guarantees

LD2302151594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1420 GMT 23 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[Text] Lvov February 23 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament will not discuss the issue of joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until it receives concrete security guarantees, according to a local newspaper which quoted the opinion of "leading circles of the supreme legislature."

"It remains to guess what comes first—the security guarantees or the technical aging of missiles liable for elimination," the "RESPUBLIKA" newspaper asked on Wednesday.

The decision of the parliament to postpone the discussion of the issue was confirmed by the Ukrainian president. However, he did not explain the reasons for the delay, the daily stressed.

Tarasyuk, Bizhan Briefing on Nuclear Arms Safety

WS2302110194 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] A briefing held yesterday at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry assessed the publication with a pretentious heading—commander in chief disclaims responsibility for safety of nuclear missiles in Ukraine—published by the newspaper IZVESTIYA on 22 February 1994 as a regular attempt of specific circles in the Russian Federation to exacerbate Russian-Ukrainian relations. Our correspondent Ihor Bak was present at this briefing.

[Begin Bak recording] First of all, I would like to clarify the matter for those who had not read this article. It says that Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, disclaims

responsibility for the safety of nuclear missiles deployed on Ukrainian soil. He reported on his decision in an official letter to the Russian defense minister. IZVESTIYA cites this letter and the facts which, as IZVESTIYA puts it, can cause social explosion in the missile units deployed on Ukrainian territory and produce unforeseeable consequences.

Therefore, at the briefing, Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, Ukrainian deputy defense minister, refuted all the figures and facts cited by IZVESTIYA. He admitted as trustworthy only the information on the number of launchers for SS-19 and SS-24 missiles which remained in combat readiness. Ivan Bizhan deemed as an invention claims that the commander of the 43d Missile Army Uladymir Mikhtyuk was forced to swear the Ukrainian loyalty oath. He is commander of the Army in which the prevailing majority of officers and warrant officers had voluntarily sworn allegiance to Ukraine. Moreover, history [as heard] makes officers—who for some reasons do not want to do it—swear loyalty to Ukraine. Due to the fact that they are specialists needed by Ukraine, nobody dismisses them from their positions. The officer strength level in the Ukrainian Missile Forces stands at over 85 percent and not at 60 percent, as IZVESTIYA reports. There are no reasons to make a fuss concerning the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, stated Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, at the briefing. At the same time, he drew the attention of the journalists to the fact that IZVESTIYA had more than once published texts of coded messages and other classified documents. Therefore, this newspaper violates the agreement on state secrets signed by CIS states. [end recording]

Ukrainian-German Disarmament Talks

Kravchuk, Kohl Discuss Assistance

LD1002184494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1812 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Kiev, 10 Feb (UKRINFORM-TASS)—A telephone conversation took place today between German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk.

During the conversation Leonid Kravchuk gave explanations on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons and also touched on bilateral Ukrainian-German relations. He stressed that Ukraine is fulfilling its obligations connected with moving toward nonnuclear status. It was also stressed that the fulfillment of these obligations entails a vast financial expenditure that is an inordinate burden on the Ukrainian economy. In this connection a request was made to Germany to give financial and technical assistance for Ukraine to fulfill its obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons. There was also discussion of expanding economic relations between the two states.

For his part, the federal chancellor expressed understanding of the problems that Ukraine is tackling and

stressed that Germany desires that Ukraine should maintain its sovereignty and move successfully along the path of reforms.

The leaders of the two states agreed on specific steps that will be made toward the further development of relations between Ukraine and Germany.

Ukrainian Ambassador Talks to Official

LD1402160294 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1220 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Bonn, 14 Feb—Ivan Piskovyy, Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany, recently visited the FRG Foreign Ministry and held a conversation with Dr. Josef Holik, the federal government spokesman on disarmament and arms control.

The federal government spokesman highly evaluated the Ukrainian Supreme Council's decision and the trilateral statement by the Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. presidents which cleared the way for Ukraine's nuclear-free future. Ivan Piskovyy emphasized that Ukraine and its leadership now need political, moral, and financial support which would make the implementation of the nuclear disarmament program possible.

These purposes, the ambassador said, could be served, among other things, by an international nuclear disarmament bank in Ukraine, an idea which was once put forward by Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk. The German side was handed a draft agreement on setting up such a fund.

Ambassador to U.S. Meets With Strobe Talbott

LD1302140394 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Text] Ukraine's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America Oleg Bilorus handed U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott the text of the 3 February 1994 resolution by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on full-scale ratification of START I and the Lisbon Protocol. During the conversation at the U.S. State Department, Oleg Bilorus stressed that Ukraine legally confirmed the consistency of the policy toward achieving a non-nuclear status, conducted by the president and the government.

On his part, Strobe Talbott pointed out that the decision by the Ukrainian parliament makes it possible to significantly increase U.S. aid to our state toward the implementation of the programs of dismantling and eliminating nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. He also put special emphasis on the personal contribution and political courage of the president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, who had been defending consistently and selflessly the necessity of the full-scale ratification of START I and the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty by Ukraine.

Deputy Defense Minister on Nuclear Disarmament

WS1002190094 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Interview with Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Bizhan by Marat Pohorelov; place and date not given; from the "Independence" program—live or recorded]

[Text] Pohorelov: Many lances have been broken on the issue of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. The concrete steps toward the resolution of this issue are often assessed without taking into account the actual reality and the set of all existent factors, that is to say, in a one-sided parochial view. Therefore, the issue returns once and again to be viewed in our programs. Today we will take a look at this with the help of General Colonel Ivan Bizhan, deputy defense minister.

Bizhan: Despite the fact that a great deal has been said about this issue in the press, television, and on the radio, many people are still interested in it. I would like to say one more time that not a treaty but a declaration and an annex to this declaration were signed by the presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States in Moscow. There are no significant discrepancies between this declaration and the Supreme Council resolution on ratifying the START I treaty. I would also want to emphasize that Ukraine's nuclear disarmament issue involves the United States as well. This is exactly what we have wanted from the very beginning, when we began to address this issue.

Carefully looking at the annex to the statement signed by the presidents, one can see that the Russian Federation for the first time committed to service the nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine, and which, according to the agreement, will be gradually transferred to Russia for dismantling. This is also one of the problems which we had been trying to solve, but which Russia had been refusing to solve, intending to exert pressure on Ukraine through this or to force it to adopt certain decisions. You know that we ourselves cannot maintain these nuclear warheads. Now, one does not have to convince anybody that the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine are our property. As you remember, one had to do this until recently, because the Russian Federation by no means wanted to admit that. It claimed that these weapons once belonged to the Soviet Union, and now they should be inherited by the Russian Federation. Therefore, it considered itself the only inheritor of these nuclear weapons. Now, when this problem has ceased to exist, another one arises: What should our state do with these nuclear weapons inherited after the downfall of the Soviet Union? For example, what could be done with the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine? Some people say that Ukraine should be a nuclear state. If this problem [of Ukraine's nuclear status] is examined in the context of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, then how can Ukraine become a nuclear state? If we agree with the

Russian Federation that Russia will service the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, and that it will replace nuclear warheads whose warranty and shelf life have expired, and that it will hand over to us the systems of control...[Bizhan pauses] However, while saying that, we should ask ourselves a question: Will Russia agree with that? Will the United States agree? Will other states agree? And a whole range of other questions. This is unreal. To link our nuclear weapons to the nuclear status of the state is the only way, however unreal.

Assuming that Ukraine should become a nuclear state, it will be necessary to adopt a resolution to establish an entire infrastructure which a nuclear state should have. We do not have such a structure. Specialists should give their opinion on whether it is possible or not to do this. Although they have already said a lot about this, let them say more. What will this involve; what problems will this cause; what costs are entailed? What will be the consequences of this decision? Do we need that? Will this increase our security? There are also other problems we should resolve in this regard. Thus, the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of our state and the nuclear status of our state are two different issues. Now we should solve this issue. The declaration signed by the president of our state and the annex to it concern nuclear weapons that we inherited from the Soviet Union and we currently possess. However, while solving this issue, we should proceed from objective circumstances. No matter what we say and what decisions are adopted, the circumstances are dictating [their terms] now. What kind of circumstances? For example, every nuclear warhead has a certain warranty period. You know that President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk, at a news conference given at Boryspil airport following his return from Moscow, said that the warranties of all the nuclear weapons deployed in our state will expire in 1999 or 2000. However, they begin to expire as early as this year. Therefore, a certain number of nuclear warheads will surpass their shelf life this year. This means that we will have to deal with this problem every year. No matter what decisions we adopt, we should resolve the problem of nuclear weapons which have surpassed their shelf life. Actually, nuclear weapons are one of the powerful security guarantees for a state, but only if a state is really a nuclear one.

For example, if we had all those elements, or all that infrastructure that accounts for the status of a nuclear state, this would unquestionably be a guarantee of our security. However, the things are not like that. The nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine today cannot be a guarantee of our security because these weapons are nothing more than our property. The entire control system, the entire production system, the entire servicing and testing system is in the Russian Federation. No matter what our desires are, this is true. For some reason, we have recently discussed only those nuclear weapons which are deployed on our territory, having in mind the problems, or aspects, of our security. However, we should not forget the fact that, with regard to conventional arms, to conventional armed forces, our state is

the second [power] on the continent, after the Russian Federation. Is this not an aspect of our state's security? It is, and it is an aspect that we can maintain on such a level of combat readiness, which would allow our Armed Forces to defend our state. It could be done at the expense of resolving the issue of nuclear weapons which are now in Ukraine. First of all, I have in mind financial aspects, when we will be able to allot larger funds to our conventional Armed Forces. Therefore, I think that we should not forget about this issue, too. Besides, the issue of our state security is an issue of our integration with European structures, including the Partnership for Peace program adopted during the recent NATO session. We should participate. We should integrate with NATO and other structures. It will also be one of the guarantees of our security.

I do not want to mention such issues as friendly relations with other states, in particular, with neighboring states, or the resolution of our many heavy economic problems. The resolution of these problems will also grant us security guarantees. Having resolved the issue of nuclear weapons deployed in our state, we will be able to resolve those other problems and aspects that constitute the entire body of our state security.

Pohorelov: Ivan Vasylyovich, let us close our interview with the following summation of the nuclear weapon issue in Ukraine today: One cannot be a king for only one day—one must also think about the future.

Bizhan: Yes, you are right. Our status with regard to nuclear weapons, which are actually our property, is a temporary situation. This temporary situation will terminate at the end of the year of 2000. The number of nuclear warheads will be decreasing every year. No matter what resolution we adopt, the objective circumstances will drive us toward a reduction of nuclear warheads deployed on Ukraine's territory. It is because of objective circumstances and the connection with serious issues related to the nuclear and ecological security of our state. I do not think anyone will adopt a resolution which could bring tragedy, either nuclear or environmental.

Official Calls for UN-Sponsored Nuclear Disarmament Fund

LD1502104894 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2204 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Kiev, 14 Feb—Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council and coordinator of the group of deputies for issues to do with ratification of the START Treaty, was interviewed by a UNIAN correspondent on nuclear problems and conditions for Ukraine to accede to the Lisbon protocol.

Mr. Durdynets noted that for these issues to be settled by the current parliament first of all guarantees from nuclear states are needed. There should be documents, in his opinion, which would make it legally binding on them not to use nuclear and conventional weapons

against Ukraine, rule out economic pressure and guarantee the integrity and inviolability of our borders. The Foreign Ministry is now at work developing the form of guarantees. Mr. Durdynets emphasized that the accession of Ukraine to the Lisbon protocol and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state is unrealistic. This contravenes both its military doctrine and official foreign policy. Mr. Durdynets's view is that "a state owning nuclear weapons" is the most acceptable formula for Ukraine.

On the question of the funds required to dismantle Ukrainian nuclear weapons, Vasyl Durdynets said a group of experts from Kharkov's physics and technology institute worked out an estimate for this. It came up with the minimum sum of \$2.8 billion. This sum is at today's rate. Mr. Durdynets spoke in favor of setting up a nuclear disarmament fund under UN auspices.

With regard to selling conventional weapons, Mr. Durdynets stressed that 38 percent of the USSR's military industrial complex was concentrated in Ukraine, although this issue so far remains unresolved. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in his view, ought to defend somewhat more actively Ukraine's right to trade arms with the international community.

Vasyl Kryuchkov, member of the standing committee for issues of defense and state security, is of the opinion that the minimum sum required to dismantle Ukrainian nuclear weapons is \$5 billion. If done professionally, it could be as much as \$10 billion.

Minister Criticizes Tripartite Accord

AU1702124194 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 9 Feb 94 p 2

[Press Agency NOVYNY interview with Ukrainian Minister of Environmental Protection Yuriy Kostenko; place and date not given: "It Is Not Disarmament, but Stripping the State Bare"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Being convinced that the tripartite agreement on the fate of Ukrainian strategic missiles that he signed conforms to the parliamentary decree on this issue, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk asked the people's deputies to annul their reservations regarding Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol and to adopt a decision on Ukraine joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

This is how the Moscow statement was commented upon by Yuriy Kostenko, people's deputy, minister of environmental protection, and head of the special working group of deputies in charge of the preparation for ratifying START-1 and acquiring Ukraine's nonnuclear status.

Kostenko: The Moscow tripartite statement has, in fact, offered an entirely different procedure for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, a procedure different from what our Supreme Council decided on the issue. The new

procedure does not take into account many aspects, associated both with Ukraine's national security and its economic interests. For this particular reason, the Moscow statement must be regarded as a totally different agreement and must be given a corresponding legal evaluation.

NOVYNY: However, it is a statement, and not an agreement. The parliament cannot either ratify or refuse to ratify it.

Kostenko: I realize this. The statement is formulated in such a manner as to make it impossible for the Supreme Council to consider it. These are so-called legal intrigues. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the supreme legislative body has adopted one procedure for nuclear disarmament and, at the same time, the executive power has proposed an entirely different one. That is why the Supreme Council, which has the right, ensured by the current Constitution, to discuss international agreements, also has the right to discuss this particular document and determine whether it is advantageous for Ukraine or, perhaps, it should be vetoed as being at variance with Ukraine's interests. Moreover, I want to stress the following point: The work conducted by the Supreme Council would, in my opinion, make it possible to more or less coordinate Ukraine's interests with those of other states that seek Ukraine's nonnuclear status. I do not see Ukraine's interests, either economic or military, in the Moscow document. Nor do I see there any security guarantees for Ukraine, guarantees about which there has been so much talk.

NOVYNY: How would you comment upon the fact that neither the statement, nor the supplement to it makes any mention of compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons transferred to Russia?

Kostenko: This once again emphasizes the fact that there exist certain discrepancies between what the Supreme Council adopted and what the president signed. The parliament's decree states clearly that there must also be compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons, whereas the Moscow statement does not deal with this issue separately. As far as I am concerned, Russia is just promising to consider this question and give some compensation.

NOVYNY: Is there any deadline for giving Ukraine compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons?

Kostenko: No, no deadline has been specified. Besides, this is difficult to do, because nobody knows at the expense of what this compensation must be made. If it is done from the money received for those 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium that Russia will sell to the United States, compensation may only be given to Ukraine after the uranium is sold on the world market. Only after that will Russia receive some real money and be able to give some monetary compensation. Today, there are no funds, absolutely nothing. It is true that there also exists such a variant (it might be the most

acceptable one for Ukraine) as compensation for the cost of every warhead. This could be done, because it is known how much uranium or plutonium they contain, and, therefore, the cost of the tactical weapons transferred by us might be determined. In accordance with preliminary estimates, it is more than \$10 billion. If we proceed from this sum, Russia is indebted to Ukraine and not the other way round, as we are being assured today. Speaking about energy sources, in view of the fact that uranium and plutonium are extremely valuable energy sources, it might be possible to make an equivalent exchange: We can give them highly enriched uranium and plutonium and they can give us oil and gas. Unfortunately, however, this procedure was not adopted, moreover, during the negotiations, such an element as plutonium was totally "omitted." It is a very expensive element. By various estimates, 1 kg of highly enriched plutonium may cost up to \$1 million and 1 kg of highly enriched uranium \$100,000. Just imagine the cost of the materials that we have already transferred to Russia.

NOVNY: Transferred with tactical weapons?

Kostenko: Yes, with tactical weapons alone, we transferred [to Russia] about 10 tonnes of highly enriched plutonium and about 90 tonnes of highly enriched uranium. What happened in Moscow cannot be referred to as nuclear disarmament; it is the stripping of the state bare. Not only in military, but also in economic and political aspects.

NOVNY: The following information is known to have been leaked from presidential circles: If Ukraine had not agreed to concessions in Washington and in Boryspil, and then also in Moscow, it might have found itself in international political and economic isolation. What is your attitude to this?

Kostenko: I cannot agree with this thesis, because it is not the availability of nuclear weapons that determines the possibility of international isolation, about which there is so much talk. Had it been so, all those states that presently create nuclear weapons would also have found themselves in isolation. Today, there are about 20 countries worldwide that either have their own nuclear weapons, or are about to create them. These are so-called threshold states, which are in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine proceeds along the road toward nuclear disarmament, and, for that reason, it cannot constitute an obstacle to anyone.

That we do not, today, have effective economic ties with other countries points to one circumstance only—the absence of reforms in Ukraine. We do not make a single step toward reforms, and as long as there are no reforms, industrial circles and financiers with large capital will not be interested in cooperating with Ukraine or in investing in its economy. That is why, if somebody says, today, that nuclear weapons have brought about Ukraine's international isolation, it will be an erroneous assessment of the situation that has taken shape. We will

soon become convinced of this. Even after the entire disarmament strategy proposed by our president is implemented, investments will not flow into Ukraine all the same. They will not flow as long as there are no real reforms. Incidentally, this was also stressed by Mr. Clinton, who said that Ukraine would only be given \$175 million and the rest when economic reforms begin to be implemented.

Kravchuk Discusses Cooperation, Agreements With Clinton

WS1802135794 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] The press service of the Ukrainian president and the Government has reported that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Bill Clinton yesterday. During the conversation, the presidents expressed satisfaction over the dynamically developing Ukrainian-U.S. relations. In particular, Bill Clinton highly commended the political course and practical actions by the Ukrainian leadership to destroy nuclear weapons according to the recent resolution of the Ukrainian parliament concerning the START Treaty. He also expressed the hope that Ukraine will shortly join the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All these steps, in the U.S. President's opinion, open new possibilities for efficient economic cooperation between Ukraine and the United States both through mutual links and influential international financial institutions. Leonid Kravchuk and Bill Clinton concluded that the issues they had agreed on, after being worked on by experts and government officials, will be prepared as documents, some of which will be signed during the official visit of the Ukrainian president to the United States on 3-7 March 1994.

Industrialized States Offer To Aid Dismantle Nuclear Arms

LD2202132194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1215 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] As many as 13 industrialized countries are prepared to offer assistance to Ukraine in dismantling nuclear weapons.

The Ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, the Federal Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Britain, the United States, Canada, Sweden and Japan handed over in Kiev Monday a message to President Leonid Kravchuk.

The document says that Western governments welcome the ratification by the Ukrainian parliament of the Moscow statement made by presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States about the elimination of Ukrainian nuclear weapons and the fact that the Ukrainian parliament asked the government to exchange instruments of ratification with signatories of the START I Treaty.

At the news conference following the meeting with Ukrainian President, the Ambassadors of the above countries said that the NATO governments intend to cooperate on a bilateral basis not only in dismantling nuclear weapons, but in restoring the environment, conversion of the military production and re-training of the military personnel.

German Magazine Interviews Ukrainian General
AU2202130894 Munich FOCUS in German 21 Feb 94
pp 185-186

[Unattributed interview with chief of staff Anatoliy Lopata; place and date not given: "Not Operational"]

[Text] Are the nuclear missiles stationed in Ukraine a threat to international peace? Moscow says they are. For a long time Washington also stuck to its anti-Ukrainian course, while the Kiev government feels that it has been wrongfully branded as the scapegoat. FOCUS talked about the background of the missile controversy with Ukrainian Chief of Staff Anatoliy Lopata. The 53-year-old former Soviet commander sees himself as belonging to the new generation of the Ukrainian Army.

FOCUS: General Lopata, what is going to happen with the 1,800 nuclear warheads and 176 missiles?

Lopata: We regard the nuclear arms as a legacy from the Soviet Union. The missiles are under Ukrainian control only in the administrative sense, while operationally they are controlled by Moscow. We have no control over the guiding systems, which means they are not operational for us. Ukraine only services and maintains the missiles. They are rather like red-hot coals that were put into our hands. We may turn them round and round but they will always burn our hand.

FOCUS: How safe are the missiles?

Lopata: This question is one of our main challenges. The SS-19 are quite outdated systems. Each missile base has exact rules for servicing. Both, the Russian Defense Ministry and Ukraine are responsible for their maintenance. Our joint responsibility has been settled in treaties.

FOCUS: But there were problems with the Russian specialists....

Lopata: You are right. Russia can use this lever to exert political pressure. However, the supervisory guarantee lies with the Russian specialists, and we have to pay them for their services.

FOCUS: But they can also refuse to....

Lopata: No, they are bound by contract. As far as the nuclear warheads are concerned, we must not forget that all combat components were produced in Russia. Ukraine set up the missiles, provided the bases, while the production center was always in Russia. Hundreds of enterprises used to be involved in one missile and its warheads. That is why the treaty establishes that the very

enterprise that assembled the components is responsible for its return. Each missile has certain dates for inspection. Sometimes the deadlines for certain components are missed as a result of the political insecurities. Nevertheless, we have so far carried out all necessary work.

FOCUS: It has been said that the lifespan of some warheads will expire in 1994.

Lopata: This year it affects only an insignificant part of the warheads, 10 percent may have to be inspected. Yet, next year it will be more, and so it will continue year after year. The lifespan of most missiles does not expire before the year 2000.

FOCUS: Does this mean that the nuclear threat remains?

Lopata: I would like to emphasize that Ukraine does not regard the nuclear missiles on its territory as arms. They are mainly of significant material value. Our objective is to return the fissile material that is produced through the destruction of the missiles, to Ukraine—for our nuclear power plants. The United States, Russia, and Ukraine have agreed that, with the help of the Americans, Russia will take care of dismantling the warheads and reprocessing the fissile material and returning it to Ukraine. Of course, Russia would like to keep its secrets.

FOCUS: Are there still any real secrets between the major superpowers in this day and age?

Lopata: The greatest secret remains the technology for the production in the individual enterprises. The United States does not have systems such as our SS-24, and will not have them in the near future, either. These are absolutely new and powerful systems with a very high accuracy. It is almost impossible to destroy these missile bases, even if their location is known. After each strike the missile starts automatically and carries out a counterstrike.

FOCUS: Yeltsin has promised that the missiles would no longer be targeted at the United States. How can he say that, considering that the missiles start automatically?

Lopata: When the program is removed the missile cannot start. There is one program block that contains various targets. Each target can be automatically selected, even during flight—yet if this block is removed all that remains is a missile that is only potentially operational. I prefer not to tell you for how long, though.

FOCUS: What is the nationality of the missile personnel?

Lopata: The soldiers and sergeants are all Ukrainian citizens, while at the level of officers it is about 50 percent. They all can choose their place of living and work—either in Ukraine or in Russia. This is the personal decision of each individual. A large part was ready to swear to defend Ukraine. Another part—mostly Russians—opted for Russia. According to our estimates

some 70 percent remain in Ukraine. All this is taking place in a very friendly atmosphere.

FOCUS: Yet, in the Crimea things are different....

Lopata: True, but we are trying to solve the problem with great caution. One condition is not to raise mutual territorial claims. The future of the Black Sea fleet and the Crimea are closely linked. It is not just a question of dividing up the fleet but also of the territory of the Crimea for the infrastructure of the fleet.

Communication systems, energy supply, and infrastructure of the Crimea are organically connected with Ukraine. The Crimea does not contribute anything to the state budget, but only causes expenses. Tourism does not yield any profits, the water and energy supply is paid for by Ukraine.

FOCUS: There are many countries in the Third World that are interested in the production of nuclear missiles. Do you know cases of Russia or Ukraine having supplied material to such countries?

Lopata: No, no, and no again.

FOCUS: But there have been most lucrative offers—a great temptation for scientists who only earn some \$20 a month.

Lopata: This danger will always exist. Besides, we only have limited possibilities to verify whether a scientist does not also work for somebody else. Every single one is personally responsible for one component or for a certain piece of information. It is necessary to create prospects for these people here.

FOCUS: Have there been cases where other countries wanted to buy nuclear arms or nuclear technology?

Lopata: I suspect that such attempts have been made.

FOCUS: How big is the military-industrial complex in Ukraine?

Lopata: Taking into account that the main part of the complex of the Soviet Union was shared between Russia and Ukraine, then Ukraine comes second today, after Russia. We used to have two academies, including one for missile technology, 34 military schools, research institutes, and test laboratories.

FOCUS: How many plants are there?

Lopata: Well, not even we ourselves know that exactly. Nobody ever thought of counting them. You must understand the system. In the Soviet Union each plant, each enterprise fulfilled tasks even for the military complex. Today we are using no more than 15 percent of the former armament enterprises for military purposes. We gave up financing the huge complexes. Ukraine no longer places any arms orders.

FOCUS: So who still buys the arms that are still being produced?

Lopata: We hardly produce any more arms. If we do not order tanks they are not produced. For economic reasons, we have been forced to embark on the path of

disarmament. For the future we would need research to launch our new Ukrainian tank on the market, for example. Yet, we do not have the money to produce it.

FOCUS: If somebody from Syria or Iraq were to ask, would you sell him something?

Lopata: If the offer were worthwhile, the government would examine it. We must look for customers.

FOCUS: Ukraine has demanded security guarantees against its powerful neighbor, Russia. Still, you do not have any troops at your eastern border.

Lopata: The creation of new structures along our eastern border is currently impossible for money problems. Ukraine does not need large armed forces but mobile reaction forces to protect its borders.

Deputies Discuss Supreme Council Agenda; NPT Not Included

LD2102233394 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2230 GMT 21 Feb 94

[Text] Kiev, 21 Feb—Members of the Supreme Council of Ukraine Presidium discussed the working agenda of the Supreme Council session on 22-26 February. The issues of an all-Ukrainian referendum, Ukraine's membership in the CIS countries' economic union, and the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] were not included in the agenda.

Participants in the presidium sitting focused their attention mainly on debating the issue of the correspondence of the Republic of Crimea's legislative acts with the Constitution of Ukraine. Vasyl Kozarenko, people's deputy of Ukraine, said this issue virtually could not be settled now because of the lack of time and absence of a mechanism whereby Crimea's legislative acts could be brought in line with the Constitution of Ukraine. Legal acts of both the president and Ukraine's and Crimea's parliaments must be assessed, in Vasyl Kozarenko's opinion, by a constitutional court, which at present is nonexistent.

In all, Supreme Council Presidium members included around 50 issues in next week's plenary agenda. The issue of introducing changes and amendments to some of Ukraine's legislative acts on privatization questions will primarily be tackled. Deputies are planning to address the question of mandatory social insurance contributions for 1994.

On 23 February, deputies are planning to discuss the Law on the Protection of Information in Automatic Systems in its second reading and elect a National Television Council [Natsionalna Rada po Telebачen-nyu]. The issue of resolving the payments crisis will also be looked at.

On Thursday, 24 February, the Supreme Council will examine the Law on Corruption in its second reading. Deputies are planning to introduce changes and amendments to the Law on the Elections of the President of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The law was adopted in May 1991 and is still unchanged.

FRANCE

Polynesian President Urges Resumption of Nuclear Tests

BR2802130994 Paris LE FIGARO in French 28 Feb 94 p 7

[Interview with Gaston Flosse, president of the French Polynesian Government, by Nicole Kern; date and place not given: "Flosse Behind Chirac—President of French Polynesian Government Wants Nuclear Test Firings To Be Resumed, Deeming Them Essential for Credibility of French Defense Policy"—first paragraph is LE FIGARO introduction]

[Text] Gaston Flosse, the president of the French Polynesian Government, has a dual interest in the debate on stopping the Mururoa nuclear tests: first, as the top political leader in the region; second, as a deputy.

Kern: What is your position in the debate on the cessation of firings?

Flosse: As a Gaullist, my view is that we have already waited too long. The credibility of the French deterrent force is at stake. Tests are essential for our defense.

Kern: What do you think the decision not to resume the tests is based on?

Flosse: It is the president of the Republic who is quite firmly opposed to it. He is the head of the army. He is the man in charge for as long as the current period of cohabitation lasts.

Kern: Has the moratorium not had the advantage of enabling better relations with the other Pacific states?

Flosse: The nuclear tests had practically been forgotten in the region, and relations would not have deteriorated if France had not discontinued them. When the last test firings were made, Australia and New Zealand already reacted less argumentatively than in the past. At the last Pacific forum, the resolution opposing the tests still figured on the agenda, but no more than usual. On the other hand, a resumption of tests after the moratorium would risk heightening tension in the area again.

Kern: So you follow the same line as Jacques Chirac?

Flosse: Absolutely. For the resumption of tests is absolutely essential to our armaments. There is a need for progress in scientific research. I never saw any real motive for the moratorium other than pulling off a political coup.

Kern: Your determination may appear to be a desire to obtain new financial resources...

Flosse: Absolutely not. The past agreement with the defense minister within the context of the orientation law enabled us to obtain more than in the past. My position is not linked with any budgetary interest, it is purely political.

Stance at 1995 NPT Talks Previewed

BR1402124394 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Feb 94 pp 83-100

[Article by Adm. Marcel Duval, former chairman of our the National Defense Studies Committee and director of DEFENSE NATIONALE: "What Future for the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty?"]

[Exerpts] The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which covers a 25-year period, will expire in 1995. Negotiations will then be needed to set the terms for its renewal. Adm. Marcel Duval was kind enough to carry out an analysis of nonproliferation, of the treaty, of the concerns of different nuclear and nonnuclear states, and finally of the prospects for the future, particularly for our country. We are most grateful to him for this very complete study. [passage omitted]

Future Prospects

Having taken stock of nonproliferation, the term hitherto used to describe the totality of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, let us now examine its future prospects on the eve of its expiry in 1995. As for the NPT itself, its indefinite renewal, which naturally is desired by the nuclear powers, would require an affirmative vote by 83 countries, since it is estimated that 165 countries will then be party to it. As the general assumption is that 45 positive votes are guaranteed, those of at least 38 developing countries will also have to be secured. The Conference of Nonaligned States, which met in 1992, set the following conditions for extending the treaty: the cessation of nuclear tests; an end to the production of nuclear weapons; implementation of the START treaties; and the total elimination of these weapons by a given deadline. Furthermore, during the conference to prepare the revision of the NPT, which took place in May 1993, it appeared that many nonnuclear states, not all of which were nonaligned states, will oppose indefinite extension and may even propose a two-year trial period, at the end of which their demands would have to be implemented through international treaties.

We have seen that the United States has now decided to meet most of these demands by proposing the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, and of another prohibiting the production of fissile materials for explosive use. For its part, the United States has already declared a moratorium on its tests until 1995, and stopped its production of fissile materials, while also accepting international monitoring of its stocks. In addition, it has ceased modernization of its nuclear arsenal, since, for the first time for 50 years, it is no longer running a nuclear program now that it has ceased further work on its mobile strategic missile, and it canceled both its light strategic missile program and its programs for new nuclear warheads for its Trident submarine missiles and for new nuclear missiles for its B2 bombers. It has also undertaken the dismantling required by the START treaties, even though these have not yet been ratified by

the other parties. In the face of this voluntary disarmament, some have wondered, analyzing statements by Americans in senior positions, whether this did not amount to a delegitimization by the United States of nuclear weapons so as to derive maximum advantage from its undisputed conventional superiority over any possible adversaries anywhere in the world.

Nevertheless, problems may still arise with other protagonists involved in the renewal of the NPT and the adoption of any other planned nonproliferation agreements linked to it. First, take the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union, which particularly raises, as has been seen, the problem of Ukraine's adherence to the NPT. There will then remain the task of dismantling those nuclear weapons affected by the START treaty, which will take over 10 years and will require considerable financial assistance, not to mention the difficulties arising from the international monitoring of its implementation. To these concerns we should add, mindful of the Chernobyl catastrophe, those over the safety of nuclear plants for peaceful purposes and over the possibility of subjecting these plants to the controls which will inevitably be required by a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons use. Finally, it is obvious that the degree to which all these proposals are welcomed in 1995 will be primarily influenced by the actions taken before this expiry by China, the most "proliferating" state whose actions frequently differ from its statements and which has the right of veto. It will also depend on the behavior of the undeclared nuclear powers. In other words, it will depend on Iraq's respect for its commitment to accepting long-term monitoring of its disarmament; on the outcome of the present confrontation over monitoring North Korea's installations; regarding Israel and Iran, on the peace process presently under way in the Middle East; while it may be hoped that the mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan will prevent their dispute over Kashmir from degenerating into open war. History teaches us that disarmament of all kinds is far more often a consequence of peace than the necessary prerequisite for it. This means that the struggle to prevent proliferation is undoubtedly far more of a political process, particularly at a regional level, than a matter of preventive technocratic measures. This does not imply that the latter have no effect, even if it is only to do everything possible to avoid the use of nuclear weapons in haste or in error, since, once the "nuclear taboo" has been breached, they have failed in their peace-keeping purpose.

Consequences for France

We now have to consider the consequences of all the above for France, which for the past 35 years has based its defense policy on the peace-keeping effect of nuclear weapons, and has largely based its foreign policy on the independence of its deterrent. Thus, the "French exception" in this area will be particularly challenged by the nonproliferation measures to be submitted in 1995 to the international community.

Of these, the major concern is obviously the total cessation of nuclear tests, since this not only poses both for ourselves and for others a threat to the safety of existing weapons, but would also prevent us from developing new programs, even though we presently have at least one major one under way, the M5, which, by considerably increasing both range and performance, is intended to give our "new generation" of nuclear-missile launching submarines (SNLE) "all-out" capabilities. To this technological constraint is added the psychological, and hence political one, which is bound to challenge the two super powers' previously-announced renunciation of mobile strategic missiles and multiple warheads, and of terrestrial and naval tactical nuclear weapons. In contrast, the cessation of production of fissile materials for explosive use would not appear to have any major consequences for our defense, at least over the medium term.

The increase in "denuclearized zones" would also seriously limit the freedom of action of our nuclear submarines, as they presently carry almost 90 percent of our nuclear deterrent capability. If this process were to extend to Europe, following the apparently conceivable withdrawal of U.S. airborne nuclear capacity still deployed there, then this would put an end to the possibility of eventually establishing a European deterrent. For this reason, and also to finally frame a common policy in this matter, it would be desirable to discuss all these nonproliferation measures within the European Union, or, failing this, on a Franco-British basis, as allowed by the recent establishment of a "Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine." At the national level, it would also appear desirable to reactivate the "Council on Exterior Nuclear Relations," set up in 1976 to respond to the concerns then beginning to be aroused here by proliferation.

The survival of our national deterrent, together with the need to consider establishing such a deterrent at the European level, must be justified in terms of the effectiveness to be expected of them in the face of threats which can be foreseen over a fairly long term. In this respect, the threat emanating from the still considerable nuclear arsenals located in the territory of the former Soviet Union has in no way disappeared, however unlikely any aggression by them appears at present. The greatest danger is probably that of the possibility of these nuclear weapons falling into the hands of groups of varying degrees of responsibility, for whom the exercise of our deterrent, backed up by the threat of massive reprisals, would run the risk both of being unacceptable to international public opinion, and of being ineffective. The same would apply, we believe, to any "troublemaker" located outside Europe who, armed with a few primitive weapons and suitable ballistic vehicles, would hide in some kind of "aggressive sanctuary," or even perpetrated nuclear blackmail.

In the face of such possible threats, two schools of thought are taking shape here. The first holds to the above doctrine, restricting it to the instance of major

aggression, actually directed against our national territory, for which it feels the present arsenal is adequate. The second considers there is a need for a limited "nuclear counterthreat," capable of deployment overseas and intended to "inhibit" the destructive capacity of a terrorist state, and if need be to "decapitate" it. This would require, in the view of this school, very accurate mobile weapons with reduced collateral effects, with adjustable power, and the capability to penetrate the ground, and would thus mean new programs, and hence the need to carry out tests. In contrast, a rapprochement seems to be emerging between the two schools over the possible benefits, in the face of these new threats, in possessing a system based on ballistic theater antimissiles, or in other words a mobile system, even though during the Cold War France was opposed to any global system. Some consider that the disadvantage of establishing such a system is that it could give the "South" the impression that it is about to replace the "East" as the Western world's enemy.

The expiry in 1995 will therefore force us to formulate a view on all these matters. As for doctrines, we do not feel it is desirable to specify too closely the future conditions in which our nuclear deterrent could be used, or particularly to say what will not be done, so as to keep all our options open. It appears obvious that this deterrent will not be able to remain the absolute priority it was during the Cold War; but, as is amply proved by the present debates over nonproliferation and also those over the future course of the Security Council, it will certainly retain its political dimension. As it is no longer possible to "disinvent" the nuclear weapon, France must protect itself from its human know-how and its technical capabilities in this area, as these are largely what will ensure its future status as a "major medium power," and, if necessary, its survival if it were to be the object of any major aggression.

White Paper Outlines New Defense Strategy

Urges Continuation of Nuclear Tests

BR1502101494 Paris LE MONDE in French
13-14 Feb 94 p 6

[Unattributed article: "Before White Paper Is Released—Most National Assembly Defense Commission Members Favor Limited Atomic 'Strike' Capacity"]

[Text] France's nuclear deterrent must be adapted to new realities and include capabilities for limited and highly accurate strikes. This is the doctrine currently advocated by a very large majority of the National Assembly's Defense Commission members in the 150-page report they have just written to present their choices before the government presents its own White Paper on Defense and military planning bill.

This is the first such parliamentary initiative in the 30 years that the Assembly has been required to give its opinion on a military planning bill.

RPR [Rally for the Republic] Ain representative and Commission President Jacques Boyon has denied charges that the commission views the report as a "counter White Paper"; the document lists the issues on which the majority and the opposition are in agreement, those on which there is some agreement between them, and those on which they disagree. PS [Socialist Party] Ille-et-Vilaine representative and former Commission President Jean-Michel Boucheron speaks of a "French-style consensus" on defense, with the only differences relating to nuclear testing and possibly the potential benefits of an antimissile defense system.

Commission members have more particularly focused on three basic issues: nuclear deterrence, the national service, and defense-related industries.

1. As for nuclear deterrence, the report states that "it is clear that while the current doctrine must be maintained, it needs to be adjusted to new realities. Our nuclear weapons must be designed bearing in mind a range of actions meant to defend our basic interests, and no longer our vital interests only. Deterrence can no longer be defined in 'weak-to-strong' terms, but we will need capabilities for limited and highly accurate strikes. Such enlarged deterrence must prompt us to renew our nuclear weapon systems," which, according to a majority of commission members, presupposes resumed atomic testing even though "our current weapons are perfectly operational until 2005." The commission notes that a broad consensus has emerged in favor of two nuclear "components": strategic submarines and a nuclear missile carried by the Rafale [fighter-bomber] (without choosing among Matra's competing Apache missile and Aerospatiale's ASLP [long-range air-to-surface missile]).

2. Conscription: This is the commission's preferred option as opposed to that of an exclusively professional army. The report notes that "developing civilian forms of national service must entail very high requirements with regard to equality of implementation—equality among such new forms as well as with the military service. In any event, the search for new civilian forms must remain compatible with national defense requirements, and the needs of the Defense Ministry must retain priority status."

3. Industry: Most commission members—a few of whom are the elected representatives of regions which boast armament production concerns—condemn the general planning commissioner's recent report which suggests that, since France cannot do everything on its own due to financial considerations, it should abandon some activity areas in order to concentrate on priority sectors.

The report states that "clear differences have emerged as to the idea of focusing on some sectors of excellence and abandoning others, as apparently suggested in a recent planning report. A broad majority of commission members oppose this notion, deemed suicidal and unrealistic for our defense industry, and dangerous for our national

independence. On the other hand, the commission acknowledges the need for European cooperation on a number of weapon types."

New Role for Conventional Forces

AU1602134594 Paris AFP in English 1334 GMT
16 Feb 94

[Text] Paris, Feb 16 (AFP)—France's conventional forces will have a new role independent of nuclear weapons under a defence white paper being prepared by the government, officials said Wednesday.

A meeting of the country's defence council attended by President Francois Mitterrand, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, other top ministers and senior officers was set to approve the white paper later Wednesday [16 February].

Since German reunification, France has carried out partial nuclear disarmament, reorganised its command structure and reduced its troop numbers.

The purpose of the white paper was to define post-Cold War strategy for the next 20 years, the officials said.

Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, French strategy was founded on a single scenario—a massive French conventional engagement alongside NATO allies in Central Europe, most likely in former Czechoslovakia.

The white paper sets out six scenarios for the commitment of French forces, the officials said, starting with "major conflict," implying use of nuclear weapons.

Others range through use of force to protect sovereignty of overseas possessions and the French sphere of influence in Africa and French action in a regional conflict developing from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The white paper also states the need for French forces to be capable of sustaining long-term and distant operations, as in peace-keeping in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and as in the Gulf war.

Mitterrand resisted pressure for change in nuclear strategy, informed sources said, and his views prevailed.

Sections of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) lobbied for a resumption of nuclear testing in order to develop small warheads that could be used in limited operations in a "madman" scenario.

Instead the strategy remains that of "the weak against the strong," as during the Cold War when the French deterrent was aimed against tens of thousands of Soviet warheads, the sources said.

Mitterrand has ordered an acceleration in the development of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the M5, scheduled to succeed the M45 in the year 2005.

The white paper will be presented to parliamentary defence and foreign affairs commissions ahead of debate in

the National Assembly next June on financing new weapons over the five years 1995-2000.

Represents Compromise on Defense

BR1602143494 Paris LIBERATION in French
16 Feb 94 pp 6-7

[Dominique Garraud Report: "Defense—A White Paper Controlled by Mitterrand"]

[Text] The government's defense White Paper for the years 2010- 2015 is coming up the home straight. Today, Francois Mitterrand will convene his second and last defense council which will include his prime minister, the foreign, defense and economy ministers, and France's main military leaders. At the same time, it was announced yesterday in the Official Journal that Edouard Balladur and Francois Leotard will on 23 February be presenting the document to the National Assembly defense committee and the Senate's foreign affairs committee, which have been specially convened for the event. This announcement appears to indicate that the White Paper will suffer no setbacks due to cohabitation.

A demonstration of a consensus "a la francaise" on defense, this agreement is however the result of a compromise imposed by the president, especially on the central issue of the nuclear deterrent force. RPR [Rally for the Republic] deputy Jacques Baumel, the vice president of the National Assembly's defense committee, said that the White Paper would be "the bastard child of cohabitation," and the facts would seem to support his statement. After being voluntarily excluded from the process of studying and drawing-up the paper which was assigned to some 100 experts in military affairs, Francois Mitterrand carefully waited for the moment to make his mark. The general secretary of the Elysee, Hubert Vedrine, indirectly participated in the development of the document, keeping in close contact with Nicolas Bazire, Edouard Balladur's principle private secretary. The head of state had already met with the defense council on 8 December to discuss the White Paper.

Francois Mitterrand underlined this role of "guardian of the doctrine" firstly by banning the resumption of nuclear testing before the end of his presidential mandate, flying in the face of all political and military advice from the parliamentary majority. He then again stressed the role just before the NATO summit at the start of January in Brussels. In an interview with AFP on 9 January, the head of state reaffirmed not only his "hostility" to resuming nuclear testing but also described the future tools of the French nuclear deterrent force: "In 1992 I decided to provide our next-generation submarines with a new missile (...) in the knowledge that this missile could also be installed on the Albion platform."

In short, this concerns the continued and accelerated development of the M5 ballistic missile intended to succeed the M45 by the year 2000 on submarines, and to develop a land-based version, the MS5 to replace the

current S3D's on the Albion platform. This option has once again been pulled apart by a number of military chiefs and certain members of the parliamentary majority who would rather quite simply shut Albion down and modernize and develop the airborne force currently equipped with mid-range missiles (ASMP).

Moreover, it is no coincidence the Francois Mitterrand omitted to mention the airborne force in his interview. For months now, he has been careful to avoid the so-called French "weak to strong" doctrine (at one time opposing the tens of thousands of Soviet warheads) from becoming a "strong to weak or mad" deterrent which implies the modernization of the French arsenal with miniature and "decapitating" charges that could be carried by combat aircraft.

With the backing of Edouard Balladur, who, it seems, is little inclined to follow the (essentially RPR) promoters of doctrinal change, the White Paper should remain faithful to the initial doctrine, including the delivery of an "ultimate deterrent force." However, it will also stress the French desire to conclude a total nuclear test ban treaty. As for components of the nuclear force (air, sea, and submarine), it should advocate their reduction to two from three, although without specifying the one that would remain alongside the nuclear missile-launching submarines...

These details will have to be provided in the military planning law for 1995-2000 which should be put before parliament next June. This plan must decide on the finances that will be earmarked over five years for the development of new weapons. No doubt that Francois Mitterrand will ensure that the M5 program is not sacrificed.

The planning law will take its lead from the White Paper, which describes the restructuring of the defense tool according to the evolution of the strategic situation. There are six possible scenarios: from a major crisis (that could require a nuclear response) to a crisis of sovereignty (in the French overseas departments and territories), and including regional crises. From this it should be possible to deduce the formats of the forces capable of intervening (quickly and far) and of managing several crises at once. These directions will ensure a certain autonomy for the conventional forces which, until now, have been completely separate from the nuclear deterrent option in the framework of an East-West conflict. The philosophy behind the White Paper is therefore to be found in Francois Leotard's constantly repeated statement that he does not want to see France "lowering her guard."

The problem is how to finance these ambitions. Here, the outlook is gloomy, given the requirements of Edouard Balladur's five year law on public spending control. A little while ago, the chiefs of staff were mentioning 5 percent as a figure for the annual volume increase in military arms expenditure between 1995 and 2000. According to the national arms delegation, a

"scant 3 percent" is needed to maintain the programs already launched (the Rafale fighter, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, the Leclerc tank, the Tigre/Gerfaut and NH90 helicopters, next-generation submarines, and ballistic missiles) for which the global cost would be around 574 billion French francs. The defense ministry has, for its part, envisaged scenarios based on 5 percent, 3 percent and 1 percent rises, and rises of even less than 1 percent. Francois Leotard today says that he "cannot do" with a rise of less than 1.5 percent.

That is the paradox: However smooth cohabitation was on the drafting of the White Paper, a nice intergovernmental and intramajority dispute on the military planning law is to be expected.

New Missile Project Expected To Impact Nuclear Strategy

BR1802161794 Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Feb 94 p 8

[Column by Rene Galy-Dejean, chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Commission and Rally for the Republic deputy in Paris: "Mr. Mitterrand's Trap"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] After the ministerial meeting in the Elysee [presidential office] on Wednesday 15 February to discuss the Defense White Paper, Rene Galy-Dejean, author of two parliamentary reports on nuclear testing and the armaments industry, accused Francois Mitterrand of setting a trap for the majority concerning the M5 strategic missile.

One of the particularly tough problems in the military planning law is to be found in the fate reserved for the future M5 missile. Between 2005 and 2010, this missile could replace the M45, which is currently under development for the new generation of submarines. The M45 will carry the latest nuclear warhead, the TN75. Thus renovated, the French strategic ocean force will comprise, by unanimous opinion, a tool for deterrence whose reliability can be guaranteed for the next 10 years.

In this context, what question should the politicians in charge be asking? In my opinion, the immediate development of the M5 is the most serious mistake that could be made in the drafting of the planning law. Not only would it be a mistake in technological terms, but also in budgetary, strategic, and therefore political terms.

Technologically, the gain in performance attributed to the future missile—and the gain which is likely to be achieved—concerns range, accuracy, payload, and stealth. So far, however, this improved missile is felt to go hand in hand with a new warhead, the TN100, which is already in the design stage at the Atomic Energy Commission. This load will yield enhanced performance in terms of penetration and accuracy.

Is all this so very urgent? This does, it is true, represent decisive progress, but in only one area: The enhanced range "gives water" to submarines, i.e., it allows them to

patrol in warm waters and to increase their potential and safety. However, as for the rest, there are a great many contradictions and uncertainties in the process!

Contradiction

We are increasing the surface of the targeted objective, while at the same time a consensus is emerging for moving away from a "city-oriented" doctrine of deterrence toward a doctrine based on the destruction of forces, in other words one that is more "targeted" and sophisticated. We are increasing the volume and payload of the missile's warhead, while every indicator points to a constant move toward nuclear warheads which are smaller in volume and weight, but which have equal strength. This is even one of France's specialties. Moreover, we are implementing a new armaments system based on the TN100—a warhead that is innovative in terms of design and operation—at a time when we are suspending nuclear tests and when, as a result, we are banning the validation of its design and development, and therefore the verification of the sought-after results.

To get around this contradiction, it is said that the current TN75 warhead, which will soon be in service, can be improved and adapted to the new M5 missile. This weakens the rhetoric and the deterrence. We find ourselves involved in an approach based on opportunity and not efficiency. Such opportunism has characterized the M5 missile since its birth and places a terrible financial burden on the defense budget and planning law.

It is estimated that the M5 missile alone, without its nuclear warhead, will cost around 65 billion francs. Its launch was announced to the Aerospatiale group in January 1992—two months before the last legislative elections—in a letter from the defense minister (Pierre Joxe). This baptism may appear blighted with some suspicion of electioneering, even if I do not ignore the problematically low order load of Aerospatiale's "strategic missiles" division.

Yet, was the military staff in favor of this? Was a decision made in the Defense Council?

At the same time, the Defense Ministry published a "reference document" on planning, the stand-in for the law that was not discussed in Parliament. This "reference document" clearly showed that merely pursuing the irreversible programmes already under way would put too much pressure on the budget capacity in the medium term. Of course, funding allocated to the M5 missile in the 1993 budget was low, and it will be equally low in 1994. However, what will become of the new planning law if program authorizations have to be increased in the

short term? We thus deprive the law of any maneuvering room, unless one major ongoing project is canceled. And who will take that risk?

Deterrence Thwarted

Consequently, we are blocking the development of our deterrence strategy. This development, which now enjoys broad consensus within the Armed Forces and the majority, is imposed by geopolitical upheavals.

We know the broad outlines of this consensus. Submarines are an important—if not key—strategic element in our defense apparatus, but the search for greater flexibility and improved adaptation to the new context has led to the implementation of a second airborne "component" fitted with the LRAS (long-range air-to-surface) missile. This "component" would have strike capacities for a second and final warning.

At the same time, the discussion of the implementation of antimissile protection is necessary in our country. From now on, Aerospatiale—despite the defection of the British over the LRAS—is in a position to develop missiles capable of stopping ballistic missiles at mid-altitude. In addition, the company alone can equip France with a long-range air-to-surface missile.

All this will be made financially impossible by the further development of the M5 missile. This missile will destroy what little flexibility a sustained budgetary effort could give to the planning law.

It is here that we meet up with politics again. The trap which the president of the republic has just set for the government and its majority was laid out in a sentence spoken in an interview given to AFP by Francois Mitterrand (LE MONDE of 11 January). He spoke of a "new missile which comprises a major improvement, namely in terms of range, and which could also be installed on the Albion platform."

So here is the M5 destroying the entire planning with all its might. Here is the compromised strategic development, the second weakened nuclear "component," and the antiballistic protection system postponed indefinitely. Here, lastly, is the Albion platform put back in the saddle and the "sanctuarization" of the reactivated territory.

Such a regression in our nuclear strategy is inconceivable. Or perhaps we are to think that Mr. Mitterrand, who came to power with a strong prejudice against deterrence, will leave his post by depriving his successor of this powerful tool, after he himself made use of it. The halting of nuclear testing and the fate of the M5 make one wonder. My feeling is that it would be desirable to stagger the implementation of the M5 in order to give France some latitude in adapting its strategy and equipping its forces for a new and dangerous world that is now emerging.

Red Cross Calls for International Ban on Laser Weapons

AU1802193394 Paris AFP in English 1923 GMT
18 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 18 (AFP)—The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stepped up its campaign to have blinding laser weapons banned by international convention.

ICRC legal adviser Louise Doswald-Beck told a press conference that "civilisation would take a step backwards if it tolerated such weapons," which could blind a person irreversibly at a distance of one kilometre (1,000 yards).

Presenting a 300 page report of experts engaged by the ICRC since 1991, Beck said "the laser weapon is silent, its ray is invisible and its effect is instantaneous."

The ICRC wants the weapon banned when the 1980 Geneva Convention is reviewed at the end of this year.

Doswald-Beck said individual shoulder-fired laser weapons costing just \$100 were already being tested in the United States and could go into production next year.

The British specialist magazine JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY revealed in 1990 that laser weapons were used by the Royal Navy against Argentine pilots during the 1982 Falkland War and could have caused the unexplained crash of three aircraft.

The ICRC also wants much tighter control on the use of anti-personnel mines which tend to kill more civilians than combatants.

Laser Weapon Ban Urged by Red Cross Could Affect Russia

PM2302122794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Feb 94 p 3

[Leonid Mlechin report: "New Generation of Lasers Could Soon Enter Various Armies' Arsenal"]

[Text] The International Red Cross Committee in Geneva has appealed to the United States and Britain, urging that the development of laser weapons, which can blind a person, be stopped.

The Red Cross is hoping to obtain a formal UN ban on the development and production of laser weapons. They are silent and invisible weapons. A person does not know that a laser is being aimed at him and has no time to prepare himself and somehow protect himself.

Laser weapons are an object of desire for all armies' generals. Several attempts to provide themselves with the combat lasers featured in science fiction novels have been dashed against the immutable laws of physics. In order to make a laser beam capable of burning through something it must be focused: This is impossible at long distances because of the law of diffraction. But it is also

impossible to kill enemy soldiers or destroy his armored vehicles at short distances using modern lasers. So far lasers have found a use in high-precision weapons guidance systems.

According to information available to the Red Cross, a new generation of lasers could soon enter Western armies' arsenals. At a 1km radius such a weapon, Red Cross specialists claim, could permanently blind a person. One of the aims is to blind aircrew. The Geneva committee also fears that portable and easy-to-use combat lasers could fall into the hands of terrorists.

The demand to stop the development of laser weapons will make life difficult not only for the United States but also for Russia, which has overtaken the West in the development of lasers for terrestrial and space use. Millions of what were then noninflationary rubles went on attempts to develop lasers to destroy satellites and ballistic missiles in space.

Tracked laser guns were developed by the "Luch" central design bureau and then the "Astrofizika" science and production association, which was led by Nikolay Ustinov, son of Dmitriy Ustinov, Central Committee secretary for the military industry and later defense minister. In 20 years 200 million rubles were spent and a dozen vulnerable tracked monsters which had no chance on the battlefield were constructed.

Under Gorbachev work to improve the monster was halted. According to IZVESTIYA reports work was recently resumed. Possibly the generals are unable to abandon their long-standing dream. Maybe physics research is not standing still and there will be new opportunities to decrease the dimensions of combat lasers and make them cheaper. Their task is to disable the enemy's optical guidance instruments and blind operators. When enemy positions are illuminated by a laser beam the electronic optical guidance systems (of an aircraft, missile launcher, tank, artillery piece, or firearm) will themselves focus this beam and be disabled. If at this moment the operator is looking through the guidance instrument's eyepiece he will lose his sight.

European Project To Employ Russian Nuclear Experts

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in Dutch 10 Feb 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "New Work for Russian Nuclear Experts"]

[Text] Three thousand Russian nuclear experts, previously working on nuclear weapons, could soon be employed at an institute for scientific and technological research in Moscow, paid for by the West and Japan. They would thus be switching to projects for the peaceful use of nuclear power and better protection for Russia's nuclear power stations.

Yesterday evening the European Parliament in Strasbourg gave the go-ahead for the founding of such an institute, by unanimously voting for a provisional protocol. This was required because the Russian Parliament, the Douma, was not able to ratify the agreement with the European Union, the United States, and Japan as a result of the stormy political events in Moscow.

During a debate in Strasbourg yesterday, the Dutch member of Parliament Jessica Larive (VVD [People's Party for Freedom and democracy]), European Parliament rapporteur on founding the new center in Moscow, referred to an urgent need to stop the braindrain from Russia of nuclear scientists who were all employed under the Soviet system on the production and maintenance of

nuclear weapons. So far 500 have already left, possibly to suspected countries such as Iraq, Libya and Iran, plus the nuclear power China.

Between 1971 and 1993 some 700,000 people lived in the 10 secret nuclear towns. Larive believes most of them are still there. But they no longer enjoy the former privileges such as high wages, free housing and education, and there are problems with food supplies. There is no other employment for the nuclear technicians, as they are bound to secrecy by the Russian Government. The hard core of 500 scientists with knowledge of the Soviet system for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons can now be employed on peaceful projects in Moscow. The European Union, the United States, and Japan have so far set aside some 126 million guilders for the center. Russia has even made a Moscow building available.

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